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TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
Drs. Karen A. Hudes*
A serious dialogue is under way in the international
community between rich and poor nations (North and South) to
determine the structure of international economic relations
in future decades. At stake are the rules which govern in-
ternational trade, finance, investment and the allocation of
world income. The new international order, first proclaimed
on May 1, 1974, in the Declaration of the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order (Resolution 3201 S-VI) and
the Programme of Action (3202 S-VI) at the closing of the
Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, has spawned an ongoing series of negotiations which
can be expected to continue for some time to come. Current
events have borne-out the statement made by Mr. Richard of
the United Kingdom on May 3, 1974 at the conclusion of the
Sixth Special Session:
I believe that this Assembly will, in later
years, be seen as a turning point: the United
Nations is committing itself to a serious at-
tempt to create a new world economic structure
through the processes of rational discussion and
orderly change. We have thus proclaimed the
agenda of much of the international community's
business for the next decade. Things will never
be the same again. 1
In the year and a half since the New International Eco-
nomic Order (NIEO) was proclaimed, various negotiations be-
tween North and South have taken place. On December 12,
1974, a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was
adopted by the 29th General Assembly. On February 28, 1975
the Lome Convention between the European Economic Community
and 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries was signed.
Such international organizations as the International Mone-
tary Fund, the World Bank (International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development), the Organization for Economic
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Cooperation and Development and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, to name but a few, found their agendas
increasingly devoted to concerns raised by developing coun-
tries. The General Assembly Seventh Special Session on De-
velopment and International Economic Cooperation, which end-
ed on September 16, 1975, issued a series of directives to
international institutions, some of them newly created, to
carry on the deliberations between North and South.
The United States has maintained that there is no need
for major structural change in the international economic
order, and that negotiations between North and South should
be devoted to a process of adjustment of the existing inter-
national economic system.2 It has been suggested that the
terminology calling for a New International Economic Order
be changed to reflect a gradual accommodation rather than a
sharp departure from the current system. For this reason,
Under-Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson has suggested
that the negotiations should be characterised in terms of a
"Global Economic Order.",3
In demanding constitutive, or fundamental,revision of
the principles governing economic relations between North
and South, developing countries insist that mere tune-up or
repair of existing machinery can no longer suffice. What is
required in the economic relations between developed and de-
veloping countries is a complete overhaul of the-economic
order. While the more radical of the developing countries
insist on the need for a wholly new system, all would agree
that significant parts should be replaced. One conclusion
which is not disputed by either developed or developing coun-
tries is that the international economic order is in need of
repair.
I am critical of the role which the United States has
chosen in the negotiations surrounding the NIEO. I believe
that the United States has played a game of "brinksmanship"
in bargaining to grant that minimum amount of "concessions"
2. The U.S. position towards the NIEO has received
primary attention in this article, with the position of other
developed countries brought in primarily to illuminate the
U.S. position. This limitation has been made not only to
keep the scope of the article within manageable proportions,
but also because the U.S. position is a chief constraint in
the implementation of the NIEO.
3. Meeting at Overseas Development Council on July 29,
1975, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
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which will "satisfy" the developing countries, in the sense
of averting a general outcry and further polarization in the
international community. One could argue that even Judged
according to the single objective of "damage limitation,"
the U.S. has failed on its own terms. Moreover, in pursuing
this policy, the U.S. has engaged in serious blunders which
have placed great stress on diplomatic channels and devalued
the image of the U.S. and its capacity to bargain in good
faith. This cost is one with which future policy makers in
the U.S. will have to contend.
A further criticism of the U.S. policy towards the NIEO
is that it is short-sighted. I would argue that when eco-
nomic conditions in the international community have under-
gone a major shift, it Is in the Interest of all nations to
make the international order accommodate to those changes as
rapidly and smoothly as possible. Furthermore, many de-
veloping countries are facing an economic crisis, one which
presents a grave threat not only to their own populations,
but to the world community as a whole. When nations "go
bankrupt" In an interdependent economic system, the reper-
cussions are felt by all--by widespread economic warfare,
failure of the world banking system, or world-wide depres-
sion.
It is argued by developing countries not only that the
existing economic order is in danger of breaking down, but
also that the rules of the game are inequitable. The in-
ternational market is not equally accessible to all nations,
international investment is concentrated among the affluent,
and prices of products from developing countries are in-
herently diminished by the functioning of the system. The
present distribution of world income is heavily skewed in
favor of the Industrialized, developed nations. Less than
one-third of the world population receives more than 85% of
world income, and in particular, the gross national product
of the U.S., which has only 6% of the World's population,
is more than double the gross national product of 80 coun-
tries with two-thirds of the world population.4 Without equal
opportunity in world economic expansion, developing coun-
tries can expect the imbalance only to be exacerbated.
It is my contention that when the underlying economic
realities which confront developing countries are kept in
4. Algeria, "Petroleum, Raw Materials and Develop-
ment," Memorandum on the Occasion of the Special Session of
the U.N. General Assembly, April 1974, at 2.
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mind, the need for a new international economic order be-
comes evident.5 Those countries which can least afford it
must bear the brunt of many problems in the world economic
situation: shortage and increased prices of food and fer-
tilizer; increased price of energy; continued world-wide
inflation and increasing cost of the Import of manufactured
goods.
In a study by the World Bank Group Staff, it was esti-
mated that even when 40 developing countries deplete their
remaining foreign exchange reserves by 20%, and after IMF
facilities are used, balange of payments deficits In 1975
would exceed $2.7 billion. ° In 1974 non-oil producing de-
veloping countries had a deficit in balance of payments on
current account of $28 billion, which was financed chiefly
by heavy borrowing.7 Over the period between 1971 and 1974,
production in 30 percent of developing countries (with
roughly half the population in developing countries) failed
to keep pace with population growth. Only one-fourth of
the developing countries had a rate of growth higher than
that of the 1 60s, while over 40 percent experienced a rela-
tive decline.S Two-thirds of the developing countries
5. For publications addressing the need for funda-
mental changes in the International economic order see:
James W. Howe et a]., The U.S. and World Development
Agenda for Action 75, Praeger (1975),
Report of Aspen Interreliglous Consultation, Global
Justice and Development, Aspen, Colorado (1974),
Republic of Algeria, Petroleum, Raw Materials and De-
velopment, Memorandum submitted by Algeria on the Occasion
of the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly (1974),
Committee for Economic Development, Strengthening the
World Monetary System (1973),
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands, Sympo-
sium on a New International Economic Order (1975),
Project RIO, Reviewing the International Economic Or-
der, Rotterdam (1975),
The 1975 Dag Hammarskjold Report, "What Now," Develop-
ment Dialogue (1975), No. 1/2.
6. Impact of Increased Materials Prices on Develop-
ing Countries, World Bank Staff, Development Digest, Vol.
XII No. 3, July 1974.
7. IMF Survey, August 25, 1975, at 243.
8. United Nations World Economic Survey, Part I,
E/5665 (1975), at 5.
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failed to attain production Increases of 6%, the target
growth rate.9 Outflows of capital to pay for public debt
service rose for 80 developing countries from about $2.8
billion in 1965 to $7.3 billion in 1972. This represented
44.5 percent of new gross inflows of capital by 1972, so
that nearly half of all capital imported by developing coun-
tries is spent on interest payments to service public
debts.10 The prices of commodities exported by developing
countries relative to their imports (the net barter terms
of trade) declined at an average yearly rate of 2.2% over
the period 1952-1972.11
In an analysis of trends in the new world economic
situation, the Secretary-General of the U.N. Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) cautioned that temporary
emergency relief would fail to meet the exigencies of "a
profound structural disequilibrium in the world economy." 12
The question whether the current economic situation was due
to cyclical factors or due to a molecular change13 in the
world order was discussed by various policy makers at a
series of meetings during the summer of 1975. U.S. Treasury
officials took the position that problems were not of a
structural nature, and that an upswing In economic activity
in industrialized countries would set developing countries
back on the track of economic growth.14
The debate seems to have been resolved in favor of a
pragmatic position that demands by developing countries are
to be met with a hard-line resistance, trading U.S. con-
9. World Economic Survey, 1974, Part Two, Economic and
Social Council, E/5681, 9 May, 1975, at 2.
10. Financial Flows to and from Developing Countries,
UNCTAD, TD/B/(XV/Misc.3) 3 June, 1975, at 64.
II. "Terms of Trade of Developing Countries," UNCTAD/CD/
Misc.60, at 4.
12. Mid-Term Review and Appraisal of the Implementa-
tion of the International Development Strategy, UNCTAD/TD/
B/530, at 9.
13. A molecular change in this context is meant to
describe a fundamental change in the character of relations
between North and South.
14. Meeting at Overseas Development Council of June 16,
1975; Charles A. Cooper, Assistant Secretary for Interna-
tional Affairs, Department of the Treasury. See also "The
Developing Countries' Demand for a New International Eco-
nomic Order" by James P. Grant, President of O.D.C.
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cessions to the extent such immediate concerns as access to
supplies of raw materials are forthcoming. This approach has
increased the polarization between North and South, with many
developing countries despairing of achieving any reform in
the structure of international institutions without escalat-
ing confrontation. By daring developing countries to prove
their capacity to affect the welfare of industrialized coun-
tries (whether through producer cartels, expropriations or
trade restrictions) before earnest effort is made to alter
the rules of the economic system, severe stress is placed
upon the viability of the present international economic
order. It appears to have been forgotten that the health
of the economic system as a whole will benefit everyone;
and that as long as necessary adjustment in the structure
of economic institutions is resisted or delayed, the grave
risk of a general economic breakdown is being taken.
Accordingly, I believe that many of the controversies
surrounding the NIEO can be resolved in a dispassionate ap-
praisal of long-term economic trends. Many of the demands
made by developing countries are consonant with the general
welfare of the international community as a whole. This
article will point out those structural changes which seem
necessary at present for stability in the international or-
der. However, the need for institutional change will become
increasingly apparent through an evolving process as nego-
tiations on the NIEO continue. Of perhaps greater importance
at this juncture is the assurance that the procedure by which
the dialogue between North and South takes place is effec-
tive. Unless the negotiating parties have confidence that
agreements reached in this process will be implemented, or
indeed whether agreement can be reached at all, dialogue
cannot advance. It is when viewed in this light that cer-
tain unresolved procedural conflicts become especially
troublesome. In particular, an unfortunate crisis in the
formulation of American foreign policy brought on by public
disagreement between the Department of State and the Depart-
ment of the Treasury has caused many to question whether at
this time the U.S. is capable of bargaining in good faith. 15
However uncertain progress has been in bridging the
considerable distance between the positions of the North
and South, it is apparent that a serious dialogue on the
NIEO is under way. It is therefore instructive to examine
15. See footnotes 64, 66, 68, 69, 70 and 137.
1975]
94 TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER [VOL.2
the results of negotiations culminating in the resolutions
made at the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions of the Gen-
eral Assembly of the U.N., or what can be referred to loose-
ly as the legislative history of the NIEO. It will no doubt
be necessary to reevaluate the importance ascribed to var-
ious events occurring before and during the negotiations as
hindsight illuminates areas of particular relevance to the
resolutions' implementation. Nevertheless, certain land-
marks have emerged as incontrovertible guideposts that will
influence further relations between North and South concern-
ing the international economic order.
I. Declaration of the New International Economic Order
A. Background of the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions
A legislative history of the Sixth and Seventh Special
Sessions of the General Assembly is necessarily incomplete,
for a number of developments spanning the years after de-
colonization have contributed to the process which culminated
in the demand for a new international economic order. The
Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions, resulting as they did in
an ambitious set of guidelines for international institutions
and a concrete programme of action, should nevertheless be
judged primarily in terms of the potential political influ-
ence they will have. Discussions of development issues have
become matters delegated to high-level officials, including
heads of government as well as foreign ministers. Also of
significance in these Special Sessions is the ability of de-
veloping countries to function as a collective bargaining
unit. In maintaining their unity through a series of hard
negotiations, the Group of 77 (now totaling 105 developing
countries) has altered the power relationship between de-
veloped and developing countries. It is from this strength-
ened bargaining position that the Group of 77 will seek im-
plementation of the General Assembly resolutions on the
NIEO.
Tracing out the legislative history of the Sixth and
Seventh Special Sessions involves not only identifying the
origins of ideas incorporated into the resolutions, but the
process which their enactment set into motion. The
Sixth Special Session marked the surfacing of a collective
bargaining unit among developing countries which had been
forming gradually since the mid 1950's. As a matter of fact,
had the Sixth Special Session never been called, the pro-
visions which were agreed upon would probably have emerged
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in much the same way at the Special Session which at the end
of 1973 had already been scheduled for September 1975. This
resolution called for a meeting of the General Assembly "at
a high political level" to examine "the political and other
implications of the state of world development and interna-
tional economic cooperation."'16 Although the attitude among
developing countries that they would have to forge political
unity in order to achieve their economic goals came into its
own at the Sixth Special Session, it had been in the process
of formation for nearly two decades.
1. Collective Bargaining Position of Developing
Countries
a. the non-aligned countries
The collective bargaining structure which emerged at
the Sixth Special Session was based on the organization of
developing countries into the Group of 77. This group grew
from meetings among developing countries stretching over 19
years. As early as 1955, a group of 29 African and Asian
countries met in Bandung at Indonesia's initiative. This
conference, which the People's Republic of China attended,
was addressed to efforts for hastening the independence of
countries still under colonial rule. The first conference
was aimed at shifting away from solidarity based merely on
regional ties and away from alliances with the great pow-
ers. The second conference, held in Cairo in 1962, sought
compromise between conflicting positions. At that confer-
ence the recommendation was made to hold an international
conference on trade and development, the precursor to UNCTAD,
which is now one of the permanent organs of the U.N. dealing
with development problems.
The third conference was held in Lusaka in 1970 to con-
sider the problem of white regimes In southern Africa. The
economic dependence of developing countries was also con-
sidered, and for the first time the concept of self-reliance
was formulated. The conference called for a decrease in de-
pendence on aid from developed countries and the establish-
ment of an effective strategy for economic, financial and
technical development. In 1972 a meeting of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the non-aligned countries at Georgetown
further defined the concept of self-reliance, and an action
programme of economic cooperation among developing coun-
16. A/Res. 3172 (XXVIII).
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tries was established.
Between September 5 and 9, 1973, the Fourth Conference
of Non-Aligned Countries was held In Algiers. The number of
countries had increased to 75, and for the first time sev-
eral large Latin American countries were present. The reso-
lutions were formulated in terms of "develooing countries"
rather than non-aligned countries, which pointedto a greater
awareness of North-South problems. 17 Economic Issues were
given increasing emphasis, and a programme of action was
drawn up which once again focused on self-reliance. The
means set down in Algiers for achieving increased coopera-
tion and Industrial development were similar to the prograrme
established in Georgetown. A new proposal was for the es-
tablishment of a development fund (presumably to be financed
by oil-exporters). The Algiers action programme of economic
cooperation which formed the basis of the negotiations at
the Sixth Special Session included the following measures:
-- Doubling of trade among developing countries;
-- Most favored nation treatment of imports from
developing countries;
-- Assistance untied to purchases from developing
countries;
-- Greater cooperation in financial and monetary
areas, to be achieved by payment and settlement
agreements and more intensive cooperation of
national and regional banks;
-- Extension of credit on preferential terms to de-
veloping countries;
-- Investment in export promoting sectors of de-
veloping countries;
-- Establishment of producers agreements (similar
to OPEC);
-- Formulation of an international code for regu-
lating direct foreign investment;
-- Improvement of postal service among developina
countries, and exchange in cultural, scientific
and commercial affairs.
17. The non-aligned countries sought to find a middle
ground between the polarization between East and West in
the Cold War years. As colonial ties became broken, eco-
nomic considerations and development issues grew increas-
ingly relevant.
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b. developing countries and the U.N.
Attempts to place the NIEO in an historical perspective
must also take into account the organization and activities
of UNCTAD. The roots of UNCTAD can be traced back to the
proposals for an International Trade Organization which grew
out of a U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment held at
Havana from November 21, 1947 to March 24, 1948. The con-
ference drew up a Charter, and many of the provisions fore-
shadow the agenda of the NIEO, including the need for gen-
eral economic development--In particular, of those countries
"in which resources are as yet relatively undeveloped"
(Article 8); international flow of capital and security of
investment (Article 12); the need for processing of indige-
nous primary commodities (Article 13, section 7a) and for
commodity agreements (Chapter VI).
The proposal for an ITO, which was designed to join the
IMF and IBRD in forming the foundation of the post-war eco-
nomic order, was never ratified by the U.S. The GATT (Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), originally intended as
an interim measure pending establishment of the ITO, imple-
mented some of the commercial policy clauses of the Havana
Charter. Some of the trade and development policies of the
ITO were later Incorporated into UNCTAD, albeit in di-
luted form.
At the recommendation of the 1962 Conference of Non-
Aligned Countries In Cairo, a resolution was passed in the
Economic and Social Council in that same yegr to convene the
first Conference on Trade and Development. 1  The first Con-
ference of UNCTAD was held in Geneva between March 24, 1964
and June 15th. Raul Prebisch was the first Secretary-Gen-
eral of the Conference, and he had headed the preparation
of a paper which outlined the problems facing developing
countries. 19 This served as a precedent for one of the most
important functions which UNCTAD has come to play: serving
as an intellectual center or "think tank" for development
issues. In addition to the consciousness-raising aspects,
the first UNCTAD conference also provided a forum for the
emergence of collective action among developing countries.
One of the most important results of the conference
was Its call for the establishment of a permanent machinery
18. E/Res. 917 XXXIV, endorsed in A/Res. 1785 XVII.
19. Raul Prebisch, "Towards a New Trade Policy for De-
velopment," E/CONF. 46/3.
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to deal with development issues. A major source of conten-
tion, which foreshadowed similar problems in negotiations on
the NIEO, was whether voting should proceed by simple major-
ity. It was clear that developing countries would be able
to vote through resolutions which did not meet the approval
of developed countries on the strength of their numbers.
However, when it came time for implementation of the reso-
lutions, support from developed countries would be necessary.
The issue was solved by a compromise measure, to provide con-
ciliation machinery for the forging of recommendations "of a
specific nature for action substantially affecting the eco-
nomic or financial interests of particular countries."
Agreement would be obtained from governments prior to voting
on matters which called for concrete implementation (e.g.
granting tariff preference). On matters relating to the as-
pirations or point of view of developing countries, voting
would be by simple majority.
UNCTAD was set up as an organ of the U.N., with a per-
manent Trade and Development Board to carry out its functions
between the periodic conferences. Although recommendations
made by UNCTAD carry a certain weight within the U.N. sys-
tem, governments are not legally bound to their implementa-
tion. A recommendation for a preference system, made at the
first Conference in 1964, is only now being implemented by
the U.S. It Is instructive to compare the wide leeway ac-
corded to decisions taken at UNCTAD by governments who have
not bound themselves legally to the rather elaborate mechan-
ism for breach of agreements contemplated by the Havana
Charter. The plans for the International Trade Organization
provided for consultation and arbitration for failure to
meet obligations (Article 93),20 compulsory jurisdiction by
the International Court of Justice (Article 96),2 1 and sus-
pension of concessions for non-compliance (Article 94).22
At the second Conference of UNCTAD in New Delhi in 1968,
only a moderate amount of agreement was reached on such mat-
ters as trade expansion among developing countries, trade
with socialist countries, shipping, the food problem, and
20. United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment
held at Havana, Cuba from November 21, 1947 to March 24,
1948, Final Act and Related Documents at 49.
21. Id. at 50.
22. i. at 49.
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the designation of a policy towards the least developed and
land-locked countries. No pro.gress was made in the areas of
access to markets or "a global strategy for development."
Dissatisfaction was expressed over the "very limited posi-
tive results that are not commensurate with the dimensions
and urgency of the development problem."23
The third Conference was held in Santiago between
April 13 and May 21, 1972. Principal areas of work were re-
structuring and reform of the international monetary system,
problems of the least developed among the developing coun-
tries, and access to markets. An important item on UNCTAD's
agenda has been the monitoring of the development decades.
The first development decade was designated by the General
Assembly in December, 1961,24 which set annual rate of growth
targets of 5% for developing countries, and provided that de-
veloped countries would "endeavor to supply . . . financial
resources to the developing countries of a minimum amount
approaching as nearly as possible to 1I" of national income.
The second development decade, proclaimed In resolution 2626
(XXV) is currently under review at the Thirtieth General As-
sembly, and its provisions have been re-interpreted in light
of NIEO resolutions.
c. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
A major development which explains many of the results
which were achieved by the Sixth Special Session is the oper-
ation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). This group was established in 1960 by the four lead-
ing producers of oil in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
Iran and Kuwait. The objective of this group, later joined
by Indonesia, Libya, Qatar and Venezuela, was to increase
the control of OPEC countries over the petroleum industry.
This aim was to be achieved through the following methods:25
a. increase in production of crude oil
b. restoration of older, higher price level of crude
oil
c. increasing profit share of governments
23. Secretary-General of UNCTAD,"The significance of
the Second Session of UNCTAD"May 7, 1968. TD/96, at 2.
24. A/Res. 1707 XVI.
25. Michael Tanzer, The Political Economy of Interna-
tional Oil and the Underdeveloped Countries (1969), at 62.
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d. greater national participation in the petroleum
industry by increasing the employment of nationals
and the share of government in industry
e. (after 1968) collection of specific statistical
information on price and distribution.
Plans for future implementation included marketing of petro-
leum by OPEC governments, ownership of shipping tonnage, and
control of refinery and marketing facilities overseas.
At a conference in Vienna In September 1971, OPEC coun-
tries considered action to counteract decreased oil revenues
from devaluation of the dollar. At a conference In Geneva
in January 1972 the OPEC countries obtained an increase in
the posted price of crude petroleum of 8.49%. By January
1974, OPEC countries had obtained price increases which
represented an increase of 478.7% over the price In January
of 1970.26 At a meeting in Vienna on September 24-27, a fur-
ther price increase of 10 percent was agreed to.
The increase in the cost of energy to other developing
countries is a source of friction between OPEC countries and
the rest of the third world. While major oil exporters had
a surplus of $70 bilion on current account in 1974, as
compared to only $6 billion in 1973, the combined deficit of
non oil-producing developing countries increased from $9
billion in 1973 to $28 billion in 1974.27 OPEC countries
have sought to soften this impact on developing countries
by offering soft term financing of oil imports and financial
and technical aid. In 1974 aid from OPEC to developing coun-
tries was estimated at $2.5 billion, or 1.8% of their GNP. 28
Various OPEC countries have recognized the utility of
an alliance with other developing countries. In accordance
with the philosophy behind the Georgetown conference, OPEC
countries recognize the potential usefulness other develop-
ing countries can have in their own process of industrializa-
tion. In addition, in a long-term confrontation with de-
veloped countries, OPEC looks to support from other develop-
ing countries. Moreover, many of those developing countries
who have been left behind the recent growth of OPEC are ex-
porters of other raw materials who would seek to set up pro-
ducer organizations along the model established by OPEC.
They seek OPEC support in this endeavor since OPEC countries
have proved to be a useful bargaining partner in negotiations
26. U.N. General Assembly, "The Hypothetical Impact of
Commodity Price Movements On World Trade," A/9544/Add.2,
12 April 1974, at 2.
27. IMF Survey, Augyst 25, 1975, at 241.
28. UNA-USA, Issues Before the United Nations General
Assembly in 1975, (hereinafter "Issues") at 36.
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with developing countries. In summary, developing countries
have found a basis for collaboration which enhances their
collective strength in winning concessions from developed
countries.
2. Convening of the Sixth Special Session
The U.S. initiative to hold a conference on the energy
crisis in Washington In February 1974, coming as it did in
the wake of the Algiers conference, was interpreted by OPEC
countries as a frontal attack. The Washington conference
was ostensibly called to institutionalize cooperation among
energy importing countries in energy conservation and in
their relations with the producing countries, as well as to
examine the problems of the poorer petroleum-importing coun-
tries. OPEC viewed the conference as an attempt to under-
mine the alliance which it had established with the develop-
Ing countries.
[T]his conference would be held with a view to
determining the new price of petroleum, and, on
the same occasion, inaugurating and consecrating
this new line of cleavage between the Third World
countries which, It is hoped, can be created on
the basis of petroleum prices. 29
On January 30, 1974 President Houari Boumediene of
Algeria, acting as President of the group of non-aligned
countries, submitted a letter to the Secretary General of
the U.N. which requested the convening of a special session
of the General Assembly for "study of the problems of raw
materials and development." In this letter, three factors
were mentioned which necessitated the special session: the
failure of the International Development Strategy, attitudes
of governments of some developed countries which violated
objectives of the International Development Strategy, and.
financial difficulties in the international community due
to the international monetary crisis. This special session
would examine the oil cartel within the context of "all the
questions relating to all types of raw materials." 30
In accordance with Articles8(a), 9 and 10 of the Rules
of Procedure of the General Assembly, a majority of member
states must agree to the gathering of a special session
29. Algeria, Memorandum, at 17.
30. Permanent Representative of Algeria to U.N.,
A/9541, February 5,1974.
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within 30 days of a proposal. Within two weeks of
Boumediene's letter the necessary 68 votes had been ob-
tained and the date of April 9, 1974 was chosen for the
commencement of the Sixth Special Session. At the time
that the Sixth Special Session was held, there had already
been a resolution passed at the Twenty-Eighth General As-
sembly to have a special session on development problems.
This special session, to be devoted to development and In-
ternational economic cooperation, had been scheduled for
September 1975. The Sixth Special Session was to be held
in addition to the original special session scheduled for
the following year.
In addition to the plans which had been made at the
lWenty-Eighth session of the General Assembly, a working
committee had been meeting to consider the drafting of a
charter of economic rights and duties of states. This Idea
had been an outgrowth of the Third Session of UNCTAD
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) which
was held in Santiago in May of 1972. The idea of having a
counterpart in the economic field to the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights was suggested by Mr. Echeverria
Alvarez, the President of Mexico, at a plenary meeting, and
the Group of 77 adopted a resolution establishing a working
group of thirty-one countries to draw up the text of a
charter.3 1 The working group had met for the first two
times in Geneva in February and July of 1973. The working
group, called the Group of 1, met again in Geneva in Febru-
ary of 1974.
At the meeting in February of the working group of the
77, a background paper was prepared which outlined those
areas which the Sixth Special Session should address. It
was recommended that concrete measures ought to be con-
sidered, avoiding mere reiteration of principles already
established in UNCTAD and other fora and that institu-
tional questions ought to be examined at a later time after
solutions were found for more immediate problems. Strategi-
cal recommendations were made, which stressed the importance
of solidarity of the Group of 77 and which cautioned that
discussions regarding economic cooperation among developing
countries remain at a general level and be carried out in
fora where only developing countries were present.
Sixteen considerations were listed which outlined the
31. Resolution 45 (111), May 18, 1972.
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need for "urgent international action on issues of world
trade In primary commodities and raw materials." Problems
mentioned included the deteriorating terms of trade of many
developing countries, whose principal exports had declined
in price, while imports from developed countries had in-
creased due to inflation. Frustration at the failure to
find solutions in current negotiations was also listed, with
disappointing implementation of the International Develop-
ment Strategy, breakdown in negotiations of commodity agree-
ments, and continued existence of trade barriers to develop-
ing countries. Also listed in the difficulties facing the
Group of 77 were transportation costs, instability of the
international monetary system, and loss of markets through
increased use of synthetic substitutes for natural products.
A programme of action was drawn up to correct those
problems identified in the first part of the background
paper, so as to
bring about a rise In the standard of living
of all the peoples of the world, with a view to
narrowing the gap separating the developed and
developing world, avoiding, at the same time,
the dangers of a world-wide recession and con-
tinued international economic instability. 32
It was considered necessary to obtain confirmation of
political will from developed countries regarding the Imple-
mentation of prior commitments in UNCTAD for the Interna-
tional Development Strategy for the Second Development Dec-
ade, and concerning agreements on trade negotiations, for
increased access to markets for developing countries and
price stabilization for some commodities. In addition, the
adoption of new measures was sought, including an inte-
grated plan for commodity trade, with establishment of in-
creases in price to match world inflation (indexation),
buffer stocks and financing of trade among developing coun-
tries. Another measure recommended for inclusion In an ac-
tion plan was the structural adjustment of tariffs in de-
veloped countries to improve the international distribution
of labor.
B. Procedure and Substance of the Sixth Special Session
Even during the Sixth Special Session itself, it was ap-
parent that a significant turning point had been reached and
32. Working Group of 77, Suggested Draft Paper, at 4.
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that a new international economic order was indeed being
established. It is becoming increasingly evident that new
ground rules are being formed 'in the international community
and that an era has passed. Unless the significance of the
Sixth Special Session is understood, it will be increasing-
ly difficult to interpret future developments in Interna-
tional relations.
There are two significant features about the Sixth
Special Session which cause it to have such importance. De-
veloping countries as a bloc used their collective strength
to press for high-level discussions at which they took the
initiative. Recognition of their collective strength will
serve as a strong impetus to maintain the cohesion among de-
veloping countries, and after several intensive negotiations
with developed countries this solidarity does not show signs
of abating. If anything, supported by recent successes and
confident from growing experience at negotiating, the Group
of 77 has achieved closer cohesion.
A second important aspect of the Sixth Special Session
is the very intense interaction between developed and de-
veloping countries. All parties in the negotiations were
constantly reminded of the interdependence of the interna-
tional economy, as issues of economic development and trans-
fer of resources came into discussion, many of them for the
first time in the context of feasible concessions. Under-
lying the bargaining positions of confrontation was the
recognition that no national economy could function without
the continued cooperation of the other nations.
After the oil embargo, developed countries realized
their dependence upon developing countries. Likewise, de-
veloping countries were confronted in a direct sense with
the inflation in the price of imports of manufactured ma-
terials which an increase in raw materials prices would
cause. In short, the increase in international trade and
increasing integration of the world economy meant that a
"beggar thy neighbor" approach would ultimately end in a
"cutting off one's nose to spite one's face."
1. Process of Negotiations
The Sixth Special Session was conducted on a series of
levels. While general statements were made in the plenary
session, a series of negotiations were carried out by an
ad hoc group of the 77. Starting in January, informal meet-
ings had been held among members of the Group of 77 at the
United Nations to plan a strategy for the Sixth Special
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Session. It was determined that the developing countries
would take a common bargaining position. By the time that
the ad hoc committee began official sittings on the lth of
April, a declaration and action programme had been drafted,
to which the Group of 77 had agreed.
The plenary session served as a platform for general
statements by delegations from April 10th through 24th.
The tone of the statements was generally positive, and the
word"interdependencelwas very frequently mentioned. How-
ever, it became obvious that the positions taken by de-
veloping and developed countries were based on different
assumptions. There did not appear to be very much middle
ground between the two categories to which Great Britain
had referred as "those who have been unduly cautious and
those who have, through their understandable impatience,
run ahead of what can be achieved."33 The Soviet Union de-
nied having responsibility for the economic situation of
developing countries, but blamed neo-colonial practices by
Western Powers.
The ad hoc committee of the Group of 77 was first to
be composed of thirteencountries, but when this proved to
be too large, a working group of 6 countries was agreed
upon: Iran (Hoveyda) as chairman, India, Pakistan,
Venezuela, Mexico and the Ivory Coast, with Upper Volta
(Diallo) as rapporteur. The ad hoc committee continued to
meet through the entire session, and a series of negotia-
tions were conducted with developing countries. As the
negotiations progressed, several separate negotiations were
held between the 5 spokesmen of the Group of 77 on the one
hand, and bargaining groups composed of the OECD countries,
the Chinese, and the Soviet bloc, on the other hand. The
meetings of the ad hoc committee of the Group of 77 ex-
panded to 36 countries as the negotiations progressed.
The ad hoc committee was also presented with six draft
resolutions which were submitted by France, Japan, Sri
Lanka, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. After a vote, the ad hoc
committee decided to consider the draft resolutions after
the declaration and action programme had been agreed upon.
Since there was no more time to consider the six resolutions
by the end of the special session, it was decided to refer
them to the next meeting of the ECOSOC. The declaration and
the action programme were considered paragraph by paragraph,
33. Mr. Ivor Richard, General Assembly, A/PV/2209,
at 13.
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with amendments which were delivered at each session. The
ultimate formulation of the wording was agreed upon after
Informal consul tationbetueen Chairman Hoveyda and Rapporteur
Diallo.
The general strategy in having a document which had
been accepted by the Group of 77 before the negotiations be-
gan, was that unless a negotiated document could be adopted
by the General Assembly by consensus, the original document
would be submitted for a vote. By the third week of the
Sixth Special Session a document had been formulated which
was considered by the ad hoc committee for referral to the
General Assembly as a "basis for consensus." The repre-
sentatives of the U.K., the U.S., and Germany stated that
they would agree to this procedure on the condition that
they would have an opportunity to clarify the meaning of
terms in the document In the plenary.
Ambassador Hoveyda reacted to this position by stating
that if the negotiated declaration and action programme were
not seen as a ready basis of consensus, that the original
draft resolutions prepared by the Group of 77 would be sub-
mitted to the plenary for voting. Algeria made an appeal to
avoid confrontation after there had been cooperation and
constructive negotiations; it was decided to support the
chairman and regard the negotiated documents as a basis for
consensus. The representative of the U.S. stated that he
had no objection to the Chairman's proposal, but that the
U.S. would maintain its reservations in the plenary. A unan-
imous decision was then made to refer the declaration and
action programme to the plenary.
2. Substance of Negotiations
The Group of 77 made a number of significant con-
cessions in altering the original documents in order to
reach a consensus. As far as the declaration was concerned,
the greatest source of contention between developing and de-
veloped countries was the provision regarding permanent
sovereignty over natural resources. This provision, Sec-
tion 4(e) of both the original and final declarations, con-
cerned the demand that compensation and the manner of na-
tionalization were to be exclusively within the jurisdiction
of the domestic state, and that disputes vould be settled
in accordance with domestic law.
The original formulation as proposed by the Group of
77 was as follows:
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
4 (e).Every country has the right to exercise
permanent sovereignty over its natural resources
and all economic activities. With this princi-
ple in mind:
(i) Every country has the right to exercise effec-
tive control over its natural resources and
their exploitation with means suitable to Its
own situation, including the right of nation-
alization or transfer of ownership to its
nationals;
(ii) The right of all States, territories and peoples
under foreign occupation, colonial rule or
apartheid, to restitution and full compensations
for the exploitation and depletion of, and dam-
ages to, the natural resources, as well as the
exploitation and manipulation of the human re-
sources of those States, territories and peoples;
(iii) Nationalization is an expression of the sovereign
right of every country to safeguard its resources;
in this connexion, every country has the right to
fix the amount of possible compensation and mode
of payment, while possible disputes have to be
solved in accordance with the domestic laws of
every country.
This principle may be applied according to the
national interests and laws of each country. It
shall in no way affect the right of all States to
conclude, in the free exercise of their sovereign
will, agreements consonant with the purposes and
principles of the United Nations. 34
The developed countries found this unacceptable, and nego-
tiations concerning this provision continued throughout the
special session. Although the developed countries were pre-
pared to support the right of permanent sovereignty, they in-
sisted that nationalization should proceed in accordance
with international law. Developing countries felt that they
had not been sufficiently involved in the formation of in-
ternational law in the past, and that reference to inter-
national law could not be considered as neutral in this con-
text.
34. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Sixth Spe-
cial Session, A/9556 (Part II) at 3, 4.
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In the last week a formulation was found which was ac-
ceptable to both developed and developing countries that did
not go into the issue of compensation, but contained a declar-
ation supporting permanent sovereignty, including the right
of nationalization. A concession by developed countries was
the provision that no state could be subjected to "economic,
political, or any other type of coercion which prevented the
exercise of this right." The American delegation made an ob-
jection to the new formulation at the last moment when the
authority of the U.S. representative to agree was overridden
by superiors. A formal objection was made on the grounds
that a new element was added to the right of nationaliza-
tion by the phrase"transfer of ownership to its nationals."
It was felt by many developing countries that the U.S. had
not bargained In good faith. A similar faux-pas was made
at the Seventh Special Session.35
Another change made in the declaration was the inclu-
sion of a provision which gave the right of restitution to
states under alien domination. This provision would apply
to Namibla, in support of the decision of the International
Court of Justice on June 21, 1971, which declared that South
Africa was illegally in that territory. The wording In Sec-
tion (g) regarding transnational corporations was changed
from "control" to "regulation and supervision."3 6 Section
(h) concerning the right to extend assistance to developing
countries under colonial and alien domination was modified
to an affirmation of the right of developing countries to
achieve liberation. 37 Paragraph (j) which concerned in-
35. See footnotes 118, 119.
36. The draft text read:
(f) Control of the activities of transnational
corporations by taking measures in the interest of the na-
tional economies of the countries where such transnational
corporations operate on the basis of the full sovereignty
of those countries; A/9556 (Part II) May 1,1974 at 4.
The final version read:
Regulation and supervision of the activities of
transnational corporations by taking measures in the in-
terest of the national economies of the countries where
such transnational corporations operate on the basis of
the full sovereignty of those countries; A/9556 (Part II)
May 1,1974 at 27.
37. The draft text read:
(h) Extending of assistance to developing coun-
tries, peoples and territories under colonial and alien
108
5YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
dexation of prices of exports of raw materials to im-
ports of manufactured goods was surprisingly allowed to re-
main in the final document, with a slight modification of
the wording from "terms of trade which have continued to de-
teriorate" to "unsatisfactory terms of trade."38 Paragraph
(t) which related to producers' associations was changed
from "Establishment and strengthening" to "Facilitating the
role which'producers' associations may play, within the
framework of international co-operation."3;
domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination,
apartheid or which are subjected to coercion, economic aq-
gression or political pressure and neo-colonialism in all
its forms and which have established or are endeavourinq to
establish effective control over their natural resources and
economic activities that have been or are still under for-
eign control; Id. at 4.
The finalversion read:
(h) Right of the developing countries and the peoples
of territories under colonial and racial domination and
foreign occupation to achieve their liberation and to re-
gain effective control over their natural resources and eco-
nomic activities; Id. at 27.
38. The draft-text read:
(i) Establishment of a just and equitable relation-
ship between the prices of raw materials, primary products,
manufactured and semi-manufactured goods exported by de-
veloping countries and the prices of raw materials, primary
commodities, manufactures, capital goods and equipment im-
ported by them with the aim of improving their terms of
trade which have continued to deteriorate; Id. at 4.
The final version read:
(j) Just and equitable relationship between the prices
of raw materials, primary products, manufactured and semi-
manufactured goods exported by developing countries and the
prices of raw materials, primary commodities, manufactures,
capital goods and equipment imported by them with the aim
of bringing about sustained improvement in their unsatisfac-
tory terms of trade and the expansion of the world economy;
Id. at 27.
39. The draft text read:
(s) Establishment and strengthening by developing
countries of producers' associations in respect of major
primary commodities of importance to the world economy;
Id. at 5.
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Negotiations surrounding the programme of action made
little progress, since fundamental differences existed be-
tween the developed and developing countries. In the third
week during a meeting with Western countries, Ambassador
Hoveyda pointed out the difference between the English and
French text of the draft documents. In the French text, at
the beginning of nearly every chapter and section and in most
individual paragraphs, the conditional Ilil faudrait" was used,
while in the English text this term was either lacking or
translated in more strict wording. When it was pointed out
by Ambassador Hoveyda that the action programme concerned
recommendations and suggestions which had to be considered
by appropriate U.N. organs, a basis for compromise was found.
Even after the action programme had been changed to in-
clude the conditional "All efforts should be made" in nearly
every chapter, it was still necessary to modify some of the
language. For example, in chapter I on raw materials, para-
graph (c) concerning producers' associations was changed
from "establishment and improvement" to "facilitate the func-
tioning, and further aims. '4O Paragraph (d) of the same
chapter concerning indexation was changed from "establish"
to "evolve" and "work for."'41 A new paragraph (g) was added
which strengthened the final document by providing for the
The final version read:
(t) Facilitating the role which producers' associations
may play, within the framework of international co-operation,
and in pursuance of their aims, inter alia, assisting in pro-
motion of sustained growth of world economy and accelerating
development of developing countries; Id. at 28.
40. The draft text read:
(c) Establishment and improvement of effective and
appropriate producers' associations and joint marketing ar-
rangements among developing countries to defend the prices
of exportable primary commodities, to increase the sharing
of markets and to stabilize markets for them.
Id. at 6.
T-e final version read:
(c) To facilitate the functioning, and to further the
aims, of producers' associations, including their joint
marketing arrangements, orderly commodity trading, improve-
ment in export income of producing developing countries and
in their terms of trade, sustained growth of world economy
for the benefit of all.
Id. at 31.
4-T. The draft text read:
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processing of raw materials in producer developing coun-
tries.4 2
The section on food remained similar, with a small
revision substituting the need to increase market oppor-
tunities in section (e)(ii) for the original provision
that inefficient producers in the developed world should not
be protected by tariff or non-tariff barriers.43 The sec-
tion on general trade was expanded to include (vii) to
facilitate better international division of labor,' (v4) to
(d) To establish a just and equitable relationship be-
tween prices of raw materials, primary commodities, semi-
manufactured and manufactured goods exported by developing
countries and the raw materials, primary commodities, food,
manufactured and semi-manufactured goods and capital equip-
ment imported by them and to establish a link between the
prices of exports of developing countries and the prices of
their imports from developed countries.
Id. at 6-7.
Th-e final version read:
(d) To evolve a just and equitable relationship between
prices of raw materials, primary commodities, semi-manufac-
tured and manufactured goods exported by developing coun-
tries and the raw materials, primary commodities, food, manu-
factured and semi-manufactured goods and capital equipment im-
ported by them and to work for a link between the prices of
exports of developing countries and the prices of their im-
ports from developed countries.
Id. at 31.
4-. (g) To take measures to promote the processinq of
raw materials in the producer developing countries.
Id. at 31.
VT. The draft text read:
(e) Developed countries should refrain from:
(ii) Protecting by means of tariff or non-tariff bar-
riers or other methods inefficient producers in the developed
world at the cost of developing countries which produce the
same products.
Id. at 7.
TFe final version read:
(e) By developed countries in evolving their policies
relating to production, stocks, imports and exports of food
to take full account of the interests of:
(ii) Developing exporting countries which need increased
market opportunities for their exports.
Id. at 32.
WI. (vii) Developed countries should make appropriate
adjustments in their economies so as to facilitate the ex-
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reimburse receipts from customs duties applied to Imports
from developing countries;4 5 and (x) compensatory financing
schemes. 46 The provision (xi) setting up buffer stocks was
qualified by the statement that developed countries would
finance "wherever necessary" and that an aim was "to con-
tribute to the expansion of world trade as a whole."47
Chapter 1I concerning the International monetary sys-
tem was changed only slightly after having been put In the
pansion and diversification of Imports from developing coun-
tries and thereby permit a rational, just and equitable in-
ternational division of labour.
Id. at 32.
47. (vi) When the importing developed countries de-
rive receipts from customs duties, taxes and other protec-
tive measures applied to imports of these products, con-
sideration should be given to the claim of the developing
countries that these receipts should be reimbursed in full
to the exporting developing countries or devoted to provid-
ing additional resources to meet their development needs.
Id. at 32.
Wi6. (ix) Until satisfactory terms of trade are
achieved for all developing countries, consideration
should be given to alternative means, including improved
compensatory financing schemes for meeting the development
needs of developing countries concerned.
Id. at 32.
2 . The draft text read:
(ix) Setting up of buffer stocks and their financing by
the international financial institutions, the developed coun-
tries and--when they are able to do so--by the developing
countries, the aim being to favour the producing and consum-
ina developina countries.
Id. at 9.
The final version read:
(xi) Setting up of buffer stocks within the framework
of commodity arrangements and their financing by interna-
tional financial institutions, wherever necessary, the de-
veloped countries and--when they are able to do so--by the
developing countries, the aim being to favour the producing
and consuming developing countries and to contribute to the
expansion of world trade as a whole.
Id. at 32.
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conditional mode. One change was the substitution in para-
graph (g) of "the review of relevant provisions" in place of
"the reform of the existing voting system."4 8 In Chapter V
on transnational corporations, the original paragraph (d)
which provided for regulation of repatriation of profits was
excluded.49 Chapter VII, concerning cooperation among de-
veloping countries was one of the only sections which did
not contain the introductory term that "all efforts should
be made."5 0 Other sections which were not placed in the con-
ditional were Chapter VI on the need for the General Assembly
to adopt the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
and Chapter IX on the role of the United Nations.
The negotiations for Chapter X of the action programme,
which concerned a special programme to help the most ser-
iously affected and least developed and the land-locked
countries, represented an important success of the Sixth
Special Session. The food crisis and the draught in Africa,
leading to mass starvation, was an underlying reality in the
world economy which gave particular urgency to the action
taken by the United Nations. The original draft prepared by
the Group of 77 did not contain any provisions to address
directly the problems of this international emergency. At
the beginning of the session, a group of twelve countries
was established and produced Chapter X. The committee was
48. The draft text read:
(g) The International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ensure ef-
fective participation by developinq countries in the deci-
sion-making process through the reform of the existing vot-
ing system.
Id. at 10.
TFe final version read:
(g) The IMF should review the relevant provisions in
order to ensure effective participation by developing coun-
tries in the decision-making process; Id. at 35.
49. (d) Regulate the repatriatio~n-of the profits ac-
cruing from their operations.
Id. at 13.
5--. 1. Collective self-reliance and growing co-opera-
tion among developing countries will further strengthen their
role in the new international economic order. Developing
countries, with a view to expanding co-operation at the re-
gional, subregional and interregional levels should take fur-
ther steps inter alia:
Id. at 3T.
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marked by a great deal of sympathy between developed and de-
veloping countries, since there was agreement about the
necessity for assistance to be mobilized within a short term.
Chapter X established a Special Fund to provide emergen-
cy relief, which was to be administered by thirty-six coun-
tries. During the negotiations of the Sixth Special Session,
it was rumored that the United States delegation would be
authorized to submit aprogramme whichwould have a great bear-
ing on the negotiations conducted throughout the session. On
the 30th of April a proposal was submitted which provided for
a $4 billion target of emergency relief and which called for
soft term loans for most seriously affected countries. This
proposal was regarded as "too little, too late" by most of
the delegations that had been involved in the setting up of
the special fund, in which oil exporting countries had been
particularly generous in pledging aid. It was also doubted
whether support within the Administration and Congress could
be found for implementation. The U.S. proposal was subse-
quently withdrawn.
3. Adoption by Consensus
On May 1, 1975 the plenary session of the General As-
sembly met to consider adoption of the draft resolution
which had been referred unanimously from the ad hoc committee
for adoption without vote. The condition for the substitu-
tion of the draft which had been revised throuqh negotiation
in place of the original draft of the Group of 77 was that
it would be adopted by consensus. The U.S. had maintained
throughout the negotiations with the ad hoc committee that
it did not accept the document and that it would reserve the
right to clarify its position regarding the content of the
resolution in the plenary session. However, the reserva-
tions expressed by Ambassador Scali on May 1, 1974 were of
such a broad scope that many developinq countries accused
the U.S. delegation of failure to bargain in good faith.
Ambassador Scali stated that the declaration and ac-
tion programme, even as revised through negotiation, did not
"represent a consensus in the accepted meaninq of that term."
Ambassador Scali explained the failure of the U.S. to object
to the unanimous decision in the ad hoc committee to refer
the drafts to the plenary, on a basis of consensus, as a de-
sire to prevent increasing polarization between the de-
veloped countries and the Group of 77. "But our objecting
at the last second would only have served to exacerbate the
divisions that we have worked to the best of our ability to
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
bridge during the past weeks.",
5 1
Reservations expressed by the U.S. dealt with the
failure of the declaration to provide for the duty under
international law of compensation upon nationalization. The
U.S. further objected to the principles of producer asso-
ciations and restitution for exploitation enumerated In the
declaration. It was also objected that regulation of trans-
national corporations in the interest of host countries
should be subject to the norms of international law. Objec-
tions to the programme of action were so substantial as to
preclude a "detailed listing and explanation." An objection
was voiced to the idea of indexation, or the linking of
prices of raw materials to manufactured goods. The U.S.
declared that it would consider commodity agreements on a
case-by-case basis. Another reservation was made to the al-
location of a specified share of the U.S. market to develop-
ing countries. The provisions in the programme of action
which related to international finance were said to be bet-
ter left to the International Monetary Fund.
The European Community also expressed reservations
about the resolutions passed without vote in the General
Assembly. Minister Scheel, speaking on behalf of the E.C.C.,
objected to provisions in the resolutions which would refund
revenues obtained In customs duties on goods imported from
developing countries. Regarding the sections relating to
commodity agreements and buffer stocks, the Community added
the proviso that the needs of consumers be taken into con-
sideration. The role of producers' associations was inter-
preted in the context of language contained in the declara-
tion, which defined the framework of operation as interna-
tional cooperation. The principle of indexation was stated
as difficult to realize.
The individual members of the E.E.C. also made specific
reservations in addition to those made by the Community as
a whole. The Netherlands stated that the principle of resti-
tution should be considered on a case-by-case basis. The
Netherlands took a conciliatory position, speaking of the
consensus by which the resolutions were adopted. The Nether-
lands was also the only developed country which stated that
it was prepared to accept the principle of indexation, but
declared that prices of imports should also include the im-
ports from other developing countries as well as from de-
veloped countries. Italy also expressed reservations, de-
51. Press Release U.S.U.N.-44(74) May 1,'1974, at 2.
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claring that the right of nationalization should be exercised
in accordance with international law. The principle of in-
dexation was declared to be unfeasible. italy also expressed
reservations about the a.bility of a free market economy to
limit the substitution of synthetics for natural raw mater-
ials. The United Kingdom echoed the need for due regard to
international law in the exercise of right of permanent sov-
ereignty over natural resources. Reservations were also ex-
pressed on the advisability of encouraging "the formation of
what would be in effect producers' cartels."
Japan had among the most restrictive of the reservations,
and Mr. Saito stated that had there been a vote Japan would
have abstained. A long list of provisions were mentioned as
being objectionable, including producer agreements, indexa-
tion, substitution of synthetics, the trade and general pref-
erence sections, freight rates, implementation of code of con-
duct for liner conferences, much of the International finance
provisions, transfer of technology, approval of OPEC by the
developing countries, assistance by the U.N. in the opera-
tion of nationalized industries, and the revision of voting
rights in International financial institutions.
The reaction of developing countries to the unexpected
series of reservations made by developed countries was mixed.
Some delegations were of the opinion that, had they known be-
forehand the extent of the reservations, they would not have
been prepared to make the concessions that they did in re-
vising the resolutions during negotiations. They would have
found it preferable to submit the original draft prepared by
the Group of 77 to a vote in the plenary. Other delegations
were satisfied by the procedure taken, since the cooperation
of developed countries would be necessary in having the
resolutions implemented.
The Mexican delegation pointed out that the resolutions
as passed were unambiguous on their face, and that the
reservations expressed after adoption by consensus did not
have any import on the meaning of the provisions. Mr.
Bouteflika, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77, under-
lined the maturity of developing countries in making sub-
stantial concessions during negotiations. He described the
process by which the resolutions had been enacted as a
1"genuine consensus." It was conceded that consensus did
not mean unanimity, and that differences existed in the in-
ternational community. The solidarity of the Group of 77
in the Sixth Special Session was interpreted as a "con-
temporary reality," one which had resulted in the use of
documents prepared by the third world as a basis for dia-
logue.
[VOL.2
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The procedure by which the resolutions had been passed
at the Sixth Special Session became a source of contention
in the international community. At the twenty-ninth session
of the General Assembly a speech by Ambassador Scali was in-
terpreted as a direct confrontation. In this speech, ob-
taining support from those "whose cooperation is vital to
implement a decision" was said to be crucial in reconciling
differences among members. The speech contained inflamma-
tory language which was viewed askance by many delegations:
Unenforceable, one-sided resolutions destroy the
authority of the United Nations . . . The function
of all parliaments is to provide expression to the
majority will. Yet, when the rule of the majority
becomes the tyranny of the majority, the minority
will cease to respect or obey it, and the parliament
will cease to function. 52
This speech was regarded by a diplomat at a European mission
to the U.N. as particularly unfortunate since the "power of
the word" was crucial to international diplomacy. Since the
verbal atmosphere in which relations are carried out have a
significant impact on negotiations, the confrontation was
considered to be counterproductive.
In the aftermath of the Sixth Special Session a harder
bargaining position was taken by developing countries. Some
delegations became less ready to make major concessions in
negotiations, since it was felt that developed countries had
been unappreciative of the compromises made by the Group of
77 at the special session. Other delegations did not be-
lieve that developed countries had been sufficiently earnest
in the negotiations at the special session, as attested by
the junior level of many negotiating delegations. In gen-
eral, it became more difficult for the less militant of the
developing countries to play a conciliatory role in soften-
ing the demands made by the Group of 77.
The new power many developing countries had exercised
at the Sixth Special Session was intoxicating at times and
it became difficult to pass even innocent resolutions.t3
52. Press Release U.S.U.N. 191(74) December 6, 1974
at 3.
53. Negotiations continued for four weeks on a reso-
lution passed at the Economic and Social Council requesting
U.N. organizations to submit a report on implementation of
the Programme of Action. Disagreement concerned the lan-
guage contained in a paragraph referring to the resolutions
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C. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
The fourth and final meeting of the working group to
draft the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
was held in Mexico City in June of 1974. The working grodp
was officially to be composed of 31 members from both de-
veloping and developed countries, but ten other countries
sent representatives to help in drafting the Charter.
UNCTAD was in charge of supervising the work done on the
Charter, in accordance with Resolution 45 (111) passed in
Santiago on May 18, 1972.
After the outcome of the Sixth Special Session, the in-
centive to make concessions was diminished. Many developing
countries felt that they would be as likely to receive a
negative vote with a version of the Charter which did not go
very far as with a version which implemented many of the
claims originally contained in the declaration and action
programme. Two major items of contention were nationaliza-
tion and producers' agreements.
The negotiations on nationalization, contained in Arti-
cle 2 of Chapter Ii ,did not result in agreement between de-
veloping and developed countries. The developed countries
insisted on the inclusion of a provision that compensation
should be provided in accordance with international law,
while developing countries believed it should be in accord-
ance with domestic law. The governing standard in interna-
tional law is that compensation be "prompt, adequate and
just." The final formulations used in the Charter, which
provided for "appropriate" compensation, had been used in a
proposal submitted by the United States,54 which was based
on wording contained in the Resolution on Permanent Sover-
eignty over Natural Resources 1803 (XVII) adopted Dec. 14,
1962. The U.S. proposal also provided for the compensa-
tion.to be made in accordance with international law, how-
ever.
Another area of contention In the Charter concerned the
right of raw material producers to form associations. Nego-
tiations on Article 5, which concerned this right, were also
passed at the Sixth Special Session. The dispute arose over
whether the language should be "taking fully into account";
"taking into account"; or "bearing in mind." E/Res. 1911
LVII, August 2, 1974.
54. UNCTAD, TD/B/AC.12/2, August 8, 1974, at 21.
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unable to bridge the distance between positions taken by
developing countries and the developed countries. The
principle of indexation was also incorporated into the
Charter in Article 28, although a concession was included
in the reference to equity to consumers.
The method by which the Charter was adopted radically
differed from that used in passing the resolutions at the
Sixth Special Session. There were 18 documents and amend-
ments proposed in the plenary session of the General Assem-
bly in addition to that submitted by the working group.
The amendments were defeated, and the Charter was enacted
by vote. Senator Percy of the U.S. delegation requested
that each article and preamble be voted on separately, which
meant a total of 127 votes. The Charter as a whole was
enacted by 120 votes in favor, 10 abstentions, and 6 op-
posed. The negative votes were cast by Belgium, Denmark,
Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom
and the United States. Abstentions were made by Austria,
Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Norway,and Spain.
There was a greater amount of support for the separate
articles of the Charter than for the Charter as a whole. If
Artiples 2 and 5 had been different the Charter would prob-
ably have been adopted by consensus. The U.S. position re-
garding the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
was further elaborated In a paper prepared in the summer of
1975.55 The Charter was criticized along with the NIEO reso-
lutions as
unbalanced documents which fall to achieve the
purposes of encouraging harmonious economic rela-
tions and cooperation for development; and which
tend to discourage rather than encourage needed
capital flow. 56
The U.S. enumerated difficulties with various provisions in
the Charter, and expressed the desire that negotiations had
continued until a text resolving "the remaining differences"
had been formulated.
Article 2 was characterized as "the most difficult and
contentious" of the entire Charter. Paragraph 1, which ex-
55. "Principal substantive issues in the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Declaration
and Plan of Action on the Establishment of a NIEO." U.S.
Mission to the U.N. hereinafter "Principal Issues."
56. Id. at 3.
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tended permanent sovereignty over not only natural resources,
but "iwealth and economic activities" was viewed as problemati-
cal, raising practical problems in such cases as jurisdiction
over exported goods. The objections to paragraph 2, dealing
with the regulation of foreign investment, reiterated the
position outlined in a policy statement on "Economic Assist-
ance and Investment Security in Developing Nations" made by
President Nixon on January 19, 1972. It was asserted that
expropriation of U.S. property should be (1) non-discrimina-
tory; (2) for a public purpose; and (3) with prompt, ade-
quate and effective compensation. Article 2 was further
criticized for falling to guarantee treatment of foreign in-
vestors according to a minimum standard under international
law. Perhaps the most objectionable provision In Article 2
was that disputes over compensation should be settled under
domestic law (paragraph c). The U.S. feared that leaving
the determination of "appropriate" compensation to the host
state might result In refusal to compensate at all. It was
further criticized that Article 2 Imposed no duty on the
host country to Import foreign capital In good faith.
Although at first glance it would appear that Irrecon-
cilable differences exist between the positions of capital
exporting and capital importing countries, the distance be-
tween these viewpoints can be narrowed when underlying eco-
nomic realities are taken Into account. On the one hand,
developing countries dependent upon foreign investment recog-
nize the need I provide a secure climate with guarantees In
order to obtain continuous transfers of capital and tech-
nology. On the other hand, it is increasingly recognized by
capital exporters that insistance upon rigid investment rules
from a prior era tends to worsen relations with host coun-
tries. In this context, the Council of the Americas, while
supporting the U.S. policy on expropriation disputes con-
tained in the 1972 presidential statement, recognized that
"inflexible trigger-type mechanisms and automatic responses
to expropriations may unproductively exacerbate nationalist
sensibilities and impair U.S. commercial and overall national
Interests. "57
Another source of opposition to the Charter was the en-
dorsement of the right of states to organize producer asso-
57. Council of the Americas, "The Trade Act of 1974
Summary of COA Member Company Views on Hemispheric Trade and
Relations," March 1975, at 8.
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ciations, contained in Article 5 of the Charter. The U.S.
was unwilling to accept any limitation on its right to re-
spond "to the actions of such cartels in order to protect
[its] own interests.1'58 Here again, it can be asserted
that economic realities render this dispute academic.
Threat of U.S. reprisals has not been effective In disband-
ing OPEC, and with respect to cartels in other products, the
U.S. position may have a provocative impact which would out-
weigh its deterrent effect.
There is some disagreement about the bearing which the
Charter will have on future international relations. The
opinion of one delegate of a developed country was that it
is only the socialist countries who still refer to the
Charter, using it as a political lever. He felt that the
Charter had lost its significance as soon as it incorporated
provisions which did not have general acceptance, and he
cited the statement of one of his colleagues as soon as the
long process of voting had been concluded: "The Charter is
now dead, and we can all return to business."
Another view of the Charter emphasizes the dynamic im-
pact which it can have in influencing international norms.
As a statement of the aspirations of developing countries
who supported the Charter, it may enhance that the acceptance
of the more controversial provisions can be obtained in the
long run. This interpretation of the Charter's significance
points to the stronger bargaining position which developing
countries can derive from an explicit statement of their ex-
pectations. Rather than consolidate the new economic order
on a step-by-step basis, waiting for each component to be
solidified before putting it into operation, the proponents
of the Charter would prefer to outline the general direc-
tion that the new economic order must take. The controversy
around the Charter as far as developing countries are con-
cerned is whether the new economic order should be con-
structed brick-by-brick or whether it is preferable to draw
up architectural plans.
The adoption of the Charter has been viewed as sympto-
matic of a failure of the United Nations in that it has led
to confrontation and polarization within an institution
which must rely upon voluntary compliance for implementa-
tion of decisions. Another view of the Charter is that it
has vindicated the usefulness of the United Nations as a
58. U.S.U.N., "Principal Issues," at 5.
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forum which accurately reflects the real political and so-
cial concerns in the international community. This view
sees the political unity achieved by the Group of 77 as a
real change in international conditions with which the world
community will have to contend. The disagreement between de-
veloping and developed countries Is interpreted as a reflec-
tion of the importance of the questions being addressed. The
Danish delegation stated along with its reservations on the
resolutions passed by the Sixth Special Session that the fail-
ure to find agreement on all of the provisions was due to the
scope of the problems being handled:
[[]t would serve no purpose to conceal the fact
that there are a number of paragraphs where it
has not been possible to find a wording which is
acceptable to my delegation. This is not sur-
prising, however, when one realizes that the
Programme of Action contains a catalogue of
nearly all the economic questions which the
different United Nations bodies have dealt with
for the last 10 years. 59
If the Charter is to be judged in terms of the degree
to which all of its provisions are subscribed to in the in-
ternational community, then it can be viewed critically.
However, it is not clear that the Group of 77 consider the
Charter as a collective bargaining agreement to which the
developed countries have committed themselves. Rather, the
Charter is viewed as a statement of their collective strength
and ability to maintain a solid front in difficult negotia-
tions. When the Charter is interpreted in this light, it
can be seen as a departure point for future negotiations be-
tween developed countries and the Group of 77, instead of as
an unrealizable set of principles.
II. Position Taken Towards the New International Economic
Order
A. Policy of Developed Countries
The resolutions of the NIEO have provided a strong in-
centive to developed countries to formulate a response to
developing countries' needs. Although in many cases the
Sixth Special Session and the Charter did no more than re-
iterate demands expressed previously, the formation of a
coalition among developing countries with OPEC as a driving
59. Mr. isaksen, General Assembly, May 2, 1974, A/PV.
2230, at 50.
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wedge gave a new urgency to the issues. With the pros-
pect of another special session to be devoted to develop-
ment issues in September 1975, both developing and de-
veloped countries felt compelled to further define their
respective positions. In addition, two significant pieces
of trade legislation, one in the U.S. and one in the E.E.C.,
were significantly influenced by the NIEO resolutions.
1. The Lome Convention
On February 28, 1975, an agreement between the E.E.C.
and 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP States)
was signed. The Lome Convention was the conclusion of a
series of negotiations which began formally on July 26,
1973. 0 Before the Convention can be implemented, the nine
national parliaments of the E.E.C. and two-thirds of the ACP
States will have to ratify it. The Convention is to extend
over a five-year period, and it provides for free access to
the Community market for nearly all of the products ex-
ported from ACP states. The trade concessions granted by
the E.E.C. are based on the principle of non-reciprocity
by developing countries for E.E.C. products. Another In-
novation of the Convention is the inclusion of a system for
stabilizing export earnings, which guarantees an Income to
countries dependent on export of any of twelve specified
products, and which links the price of sugar to prices
guaranteed to Community producers.
The Lome Convention is viewed as a significant achieve-
ment by many of the ACP States, who were able to "present a
united front throughout the negotiations."6 1 However, the
provisions for the transfer of nearly $3.5 billion, more
than 80% of which in grants and the rest in soft term loans,
are considered to be disappointingly small. Central banks
and national financial institutions of ACP States are to
play an Increased role In implementing the payments.
Another feature of the Convention is the provision for In-
dustrial cooperation and assistance in establishing manu-
facturing facilities in developing countries. An indus-
trial promotion scheme is to be supervised by a newly
established Industrial Development Centre run by ACP States
and the Community. The transfer of technology and estab-
60. Spokesman's Group, Commission of the European Com-
munities, P-13, February 1975, at 2.
61. Id. at 2.
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lishment of firms is left to private business.
Although the Lome Convention incorporates a number of
innovative provisions, it is at best a partial response to
problems raised by developing countries in the negotiations
for the NIEO. The magnitude of resource transfer is small;
there is no increased access to the Common Market for many
goods of export interest to developing countries; and there
is some doubt whether the Convention will be ratified. The
suspension of customs duties on goods imported from the ACP
States on a non-reciprocal basis is, however, one direct
response to a provision contained in the Programme of Action
of the Sixth Special Session. Perhaps the most striking fea-
ture of the Lome Convention is the process by which it was
negotiated, with collective bargaining by the ACP States
despite disparate interests. In addition, the fact that
agreement could be reached between developed and develop-
ing countries after protracted bargaining had a calming
influence on the preparations for the Seventh Special Ses-
sion.
2. The 1974 Trade Act of the U.S.62
The trade scheme adopted by the U.S. provides a con-
trast to the concessions granted to developing countries by
the E.E.C. On January 3, 1975, Public Law 93-618 (the 1974
Trade Act) was enacted. The Trade Act grants authority for
the U.S. to participate in multilateral trade negotiations,
but also contains such protectionist provisions as author-
ity for imposition of import surcharge (Section 122), more
readily applied restrictions on imports (Sections 201 and
203), and retaliation against cartel activities (Section
108). Although trade benefits for developing countries are
granted by the Trade Act, many nationalistic provisions
severely limit the positive aspects.
Title V of this law concerns a generalized system of
preferences (GSP), which authorizes the President to allow
imports from developing countries duty-free access to the
U.S. market. The procedure by which products are desig-
nated for GSP benefits is outlined in Section 503 of the
Trade Act. A list of eligible articles is drawn up by the
President, published in the Federal Register, and hearings
are held by the International Tariff Commission to deter-
mine the "probable economic effect" on domestic producers,
labor and consumers. After receiving the Commission's ad-
62. Public Law 93-618 (H.R. 10710).
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vice, the President is empowered to issue an executive order
of those products to receive GSP benefits. A list of eli-
gible articles was published in the Federal Register on
March 26, 1975, but the scheme has not yet gone Into effect.
The U.S. is the final developed country to implement the
proposal for a GSP adopted at the first session of UNCTAD
in 1964. Eleven developed market economies and four so-
cialist developed countries (including the USSR) have
adopted GSP schemes.
The purpose of GSP schemes is to stimulate export of
manufactures and semi-manufactures, with the constraint that
domestic competition in the preference-granting country
should not be unduly affected. In order to achieve this end,
elaborate safeguard provisions are Incorporated into GSP
schemes. Some countries (like the EEC and Japan) have intro-
duced a priori limitations, with a basic amount of imports
alloweiaccording to past trade performance plus a marginal
increase or supplementary amount. Other countries with GSP
schemes provide safeguard procedures via an escape clause
which defines when preferences will be withdrawn. Under the
U.S. escape clause, imports are limited to 50% or $25 million
of a product per year in cases where there is a competitive
domestic producer [Section 504 (c)(1)].
There are several limitations on the application of the
U.S. GSP scheme which have aroused strong negative reactions
among developing countries. Section 502(b)(2) of the Act,
which disqualifies OPEC countries from the GSP, has caused
the U.S. Administration various difficulties, including the
canceling of a trip by Secretary of State Kissinger to
Buenos Aires (retaliation for the exclusion of Venezuela
and Ecuador from the scheme). A bill seeking to soften the
effects of Section 502(b)(2) by authorizing preferences for
OPEC countries that did not embargo oil in 1973-74
(Venezuela, Ecuador, Iran, Nigeria, Indonesia and Gabon)
was introduced by the Administration during the summer of
1975. However, House Ways and Means Committee leaders did
not act on the preferences bill. Other countries entering
producer associations which "withhold supplies of vital com-
modity resources from international trade or raise the
price of such commodities to an unreasonable level and cause
serious disruption of the world economy" are also exempted
from GSP benefits under this section.
Under Sections 502(b)(4) and (6) GSP eligibility is de-
nied to any country which has nationalized the property of
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a U.S. national without provision for prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation. It Is unfortunate that the commit-
ment to increase trade opportunities for developing coun-
tries has been overshadowed by the protective and retaliatory
provisions contained in the Trade Act. In addition, in the
crucial area regarding the removal of nontariff barriers, the
hands of U.S. negotiators are tied by the language contained
in Section 102(a) to the effect that "nothing in this sub-
section shall be construed as prior approval of any legisla-
tion which may be necessary to implement an agreement con-
cerning barriers to [or other distortions of] international
trade." On balance, the 1974 Trade Act has probably served
to heighten developing countries' mistrust of the ability of
the U.S. to respond to their concerns.
3. The International Conference on Energy
Perhaps the event having greatest impact on the prepara-
tions for the Seventh Special Session was the failure of a
preparatory meeting in Paris, in April 1975, for interna-
tional energy discussions. At that meeting, the U.S., the
E.E.C., and Japan were unable to agree with four oil-pro-
ducing countries--Saudi Arabia, Iran, Algeria and Venezuela--
and three non-oil producing countries--India, Zaire and
Brazil--on the agenda for a full-scale conference. The U.S.
resisted the inclusion of raw materials other than oil for
discussion at the energy conference, while OPEC countries
maintained solidarity with other developing countries by In-
sisting that negotiations be linked to general development
demands and other commodities. 63 The conference was In-
definitely postponed, in order to give the industrial coun-
tries time to adjust to the political reality that talks on
guaranteed security of energy supply could not proceed with-
out simultaneous dialogue on the concerns of non-oil pro-
ducing countries.
Once it became clear that the considerable bargaining
leverage of OPEC countries was inextricably linked to de-
mands of developing countries for a NIEO, a split within the
U.S. Administration became visible. The Treasury Department,
63. The U.S. should have foreseen that insistence upon
discussion of energy issues alone was doomed to failure. De-
veloping countries had stated their intention to link energy
talks to discussion of overall development demands at the
Dakar Conference in February and at the OPEC Heads of State
Conference at Algiers in March.
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headed by William E. Simon, vigorously opposed any con-
cession to demands of developing countries. While the ar-
gument was couched in terms of the values of the free enter-
prise system, an ideological repugnance to negotiations
with an oil cartel and a refusal to open the Pandora's box
of interference with the market mechanism,64 Simon's posi-
tion was based on a hard-nosed view of underlying power rela-
tions. Simon, supported by Under-Secretary Jack F. Bennett
and Assistant Secretary Gerald L. Parsky, believed that OPEC
could be broken up eventually through a policy of energy con-
servation and alternative sources of supply. The threat of
producer associations in other raw materials was not seen
to be likely.
The State Department viewed the increasing polarization
between the industrialized countries and the developing
countries as a serious problem. The bloc of OPEC and the
non-oil producing countries in the Group of 77 was con-
sidered as a present reality, which could be split apart
more easily through skillfully designed incentives than
through major confrontation. Accordingly, a special Inter-
agency task force was appointed to come up with an activist,
positive position for the U.S. to take at the Seventh Spe-
cial Session. It was determined that the outcome of the
Sixth Special Session which had served to widen the dis-
tance between developing countries and the industrialized
world should not be duplicated.
The State Department hoped to avoid a major confronta-
tion by the combination of offering specific proposals at
the Seventh Special Session, and of organizing a meeting
which would pre-empt the discussion in the General Assem-
bly. In order for this policy-to work, however, it was
necessary for the U.S. to maintain a convincing position
that the attitude towards developing countries' demands had
softened. Unfortunately, in the process of preparing speech-
es for foreign consumption, Henry Kissinger opened his flank
to criticism from the Treasury Department. The dispute was
widely covered by the press, so that any attempt to placate
domestic critics had the immediate effect of undermining
American credibility. The net effect only served to dis-
credit the ability of the present Administration, if not
institutions of U.S. government as a whole, to formulate an
64. See William Safire, "Brother, Can You Spare A
Paradigm?" N.Y. Times, June 2, 1975, at 25, col. 2.
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internally consistent policy towards development issues.
While the substantive position of the U.S. was being
ironed out, in a controversial move also bitterly resisted
by the Treasury Department, Under-Secretary of State
Charles W. Robinson met separately with members of the
original ten-nation preparatory group that had met In Paris
in April, in an attempt to set up an international energy
conference. On July 15th, the U.S. was able to announce
that agreement had been obtained from Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Venezuela, and Brazil for an international energy confer-
ence.65 In order to reconvene the conference, it was neces-
sary for the U.S. to agree to negotiate on a wide range of
NIEO issues concurrently with discussions of price and sup-
ply of energy. However, it was felt that this forum would
be much preferable to that of the U.N. system, where voting
was heavily weighted in favor of developing nations.
The structure of the Paris meeting would be determined
in three phases. A meeting at the subcabinet level would
take place in October among the group of ten which had met
in April. By December the group would be expanded to consist
of nineteen developing country representatives (eight from
OPEC) and eight developed country representatives. This
group of 27 would meet at the ministerial level in four
commissions, each composed of a maximum of 15 members. The
commissions would deal with (a) energy, (b) commodities,
(c) development issues and (d) financial problems. The
financial commission, included at the insistence of Saudi
Arabia, would not be concerned with international monetary
reform, due to resistance from the U.S. and several E.E.C.
countries, including France.
The conference was viewed by many developing countries
as a dilatory tactic. Many governments of developing na-
tions did not trust the willingness of the U.S. to nego-
tiate in any of the commissions other than energy. This
mistrust found outlet in the dispute about the procedure
linking progress in the various commissions. Developing
countries wanted there to be riqid ties between negotiations
in the separate commissions, so that progress in talks on
energy would act as a stimulus to discussion in the other
commissions. The U.S. wanted there to be "parallelism," or
only loose correspondence. Another disagreement was the ex-
tent to which negotiations would have a bearing on dis-
cussions in other fora. U.N. agencies, OPEC, and the
65. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1975, at 50, col. 1.
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International Energy Agency were to send observers, but it
was not settled whether decisions taken in the commissions
would guide actions in other international bodies.
By setting up a new forum which could conceivably over-
see interrelated negotiations on NIEO demands, it was hoped
that direct confrontation would be avoided at the Seventh
Special Session. However, the credibility of U.S. intent to
breathe substance into the procedural forum which it had
created for negotiations was simultaneously being undermined
by those arguments which were being used domestically by the
State Department to obtain support of the Treasury Depart-
ment. One Treasury Department official managed to leak to
the press the rationale by which the Administration had
adopted the scheme:
At the meeting with President Ford and all his
economic advisers, Secretary Kissinger ad-
vanced a plan to fool the third world coun-
tries by setting up separate commissions to
talk raw material prices--just jawboning ses-
sions--while the oil cartel was dealt with sepa-
rately. To an experienced politician 'setting
up a committee' is a way of putting a problem
on a shelf until it is forgotten: President
Ford saw the Kissinger plan as a device for
talking raw materials cartels to death. 66
By committing the U.S. to economic parleys without any
prior resolution of the underlying position to be taken in
addressing NIEO demands, the U.S. was taking a serious gam-
ble. Unless the U.S. could be forthcoming on any of the
substantive issues involved, the credibility of American
negotiators would be further eroded. Not only would delay
in confronting the issues intensify the problems to be
faced, but the use of international cooperation in dealing
with such problems would become less likely.
4. The OECD Ministers Meeting of May 28th 1975
In response to the importance that was being ascribed
to the Seventh Special Session by developing countries and
the intensity and high level at which the Group of 77 was
preparing for negotiations, the 18 industrialized members
of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment) devoted considerable attention to development
issues at a spectal session of their Executive Committee,
66. N.Y. Times, June 2, 1975, at 25, col. 2.
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which met at ministerial level in Paris on May 28, 1975.
Particular emphasis was placed on the important political
Impact of development issues to be considered at the Seventh
Special Session, the 30th General Assembly, and UNCTAD meet-
ings. Two resolutions were passed at the meeting. The
first resolution concerned the establishment of a high-level
group on commodities which would consider the problem ac-
cording to particular products. The possibility of con-
certed action by particular producers and groups of pro-
ducers would be studied and policy objectives of consumers
and producers would be explored, with an emphasis on medium
and long term perspective.
The second resolution was a general declaration on
"Relations with Developing Countries." The wording of the
resolution was in very bland terms:
3. Ministers resolved to Intensify their efforts
to cooperate with [developing] countries in their
endeavors to improve the conditions of life of
their people and to participate increasingly in
the benefits of an Improved and expanding world
eco nomy . * '
5. They determined to consider policies aimed at
strengthening the position of the developing coun-
tries in the world economy and expressed their
willingness to discuss with the developing coun-
tries the relevant issues, with particular em-
phasis on food production, energy, commodities,
and development assistance for the most serious-
ly affected countries. 67
The wording of the declaration had been intentionally kept
vague through hard negotiations by Treasury Officials 68 who
had resented the formulation of speeches prepared by Henry
Kissinger for the occasion.
The substantive position of the U.S. towards develop-
ment issues was set forth by Henry Kissinger in three
speeches given on May 13th, 27th and 28th. The dispute be-
tween the Department of State and the Treasury Department
came to a head on the clearance of a major policy speech de-
livered to the Kansas City International Relations Council
67. OECD Declaration on Relations with Developing Coun-
tries,May 28, 1975, at 1.
68. John Ray, Director, Office of Trade Policy, Depart-
ment of the Treasury, at meeting of U.N. Association, June
I1, 1975
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on May 13th. In what was seen as a major shift and signal
of a greater responsiveness to NIEO demands, Treasury De-
partment officials had been consulted only after the major
lines of the speech had been drafted. Last minute amend-
ments deleted mention of a "new world economic order"69 and
added the caveat that indexing would not be. supported.70
Although the tone of the May 13th speech was conciliatory,
concrete proposals were not very far reaching and did not
address developing countries' chief demands. In general,
the call for a NIEO was rejected. "[W]e are convinced that
the present economic system has generally served the world
well." However, it was recognized that developing countries
did not believe that they participated equally in the bene-
fits of the world economy, and the U.S. committed itself to
rectifying and improving this situation. "We recognize that
an international order will be durable only if its members
truly accept it. . . . [Wie are prepared to strengthen and
expand the international economic system."
In the rest of the May 13th speech the position vis-a-
vis commodities was less forthcoming. Indexation was dis-
missed as disadvantageous to the poorest countries and an
artificial interference with the market mechanism. A con-
cession was the recognition of the limitations on the opera-
tion of private capital, which did not result in an optimal
level of investment in developing countries due to unstable
prices and political factors. However, rather than sup-
porting the proposal for an integrated approach to com-
modities advanced by developing countries to deal with these
problems, the U.S. recommended that a "case-by-case" method
be used in "arrangements in individual commodities." The
U.S. also proposed to deal with the problem of increased
processing of commodities by attacking import restrictions
in developed countries through the Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations (MTN) in GATT, and stimulation of investment in de-
veloping countries through the World Bank.
In the speech delivered by Henry Kissinger to the In-
ternational Energy Agency on May 27, 1975, the main thrust
of the proposals was directed to the need for a concerted
energy policy combining conservation, the development of
alternate sources of energy, and a tariff policy which would
69. "A New Economic Order,"- James Reston, N.Y. Times,
May 30, 1975, at 31, col. 5.
70. "Kissinger's New Role," Bernard Gwertzman, N.Y.
Times, June 4, 1975, at 53, col. 2.
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protect the creation of domestic energy supplies from the
potential of predatory pricing policies on the part of OPEC.
In a section devoted to relations with producers, attention
was given to investment opportunities for recycling oil dol-
lars, Including the establishment of industries such as
fertilizer in producer countries with the technology of in-
dustrialized countries.
One strain running throughout the three Kissinger
speeches was the need to cope with .the special problems of
the "most seriously affected" countries, or the poorest
among the developing countries, whose economies suffered
from the impact of increased oil prices most strongly. In
the May 13th speech the problems of these countries, number-
ing about forty, were singled out for attention.
A serious concern must be the needs of the poor-
est. They have been the most grievously affected
by the-food and energy crises of the past 2 years.
Their fate affects us morally as well as mater-
ially. Their prosperity would contribute to ours.
And their participation in the global economy is
required so that all nations, and not only the
richest, have a stake in the world which we are
building. 71
While the need to aid these countries could not be
doubted, and at least some if not'exclusively humanitarian
motives had prompted the focusing on these problems, Amer-
ican overtures were viewed with suspicion among the Group
of 7Y as an attempt to dissociate the non-oil-producing de-
veloping countries from OPEC. In fact, the May 27th speech
pointed out the vulnerability of the poorest developing
countries to confrontation between the North and South.
If the terribly complex issues before us are to
be resolved through tests of strength, It is not
the advanced industrial powers who will pay the
highest price. Instead, it will be the poorest
and most disadvantaged--those in whose name and
for whose benefit these tactics are purportedly
used.72
71. Henry A. Kissinger, "Strengthening the World Eco-
nomic Structure," Speech before the Kansas City Interna-
tional Relations Council, May 13, 1975, Bureau of Public
Affairs, at 3.
72. U.S. Mission to the U.N. Address by Henry A.
Kissinger before the International Energy Agency, Paris,
France, May 27, 1975, at 3.
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The speech presented a challenge to OPEC countries to join
OECD countries in alleviating the immediate payments prob-
lems of the most seriously affected countries. In fact, on
August 7, 1975 the IMF announced the contribution of $149
million SDR's (Special Drawing Rights, approximately equiva-
lent to $177 million), by 18 OECD and OPEC countries to sub-
sidize interest rates charged by loans from an $8 billion
"oil facility."7 3 This fund, monitored by the IMF and con-
sisting of surplus dollars mostly from OPEC countries, was
created originally to allow the IMF to lend at commercial
rates and to provide assistance to the poorest countries to
pay for increased import deficits.
The final proposal in the May 27th speech referred to
the U.S. desire to resume the preparatory meeting in Paris
for an energy conference. The format suggested by the U.S.
was that the commissions would proceed without fixed dead-
lines for the conclusion of agreement, thereby alleviating
the risk, from the U.S. perspective, that willingness for
progress in one sphere would have to be coupled with nego-
tiations in a less desired area. The work of the commis-
sions was proposed as a supplement to work In other related
international bodies, acting as a stimulus rather than a sub-
stitute.
The May 28th speech before the Ministerial Council of
the OECD did not add much to the Kansas City speech. The
debate about whether discussion should refer to a NIEO
rather than improvement of the existing system was dis-
missed as largely irrelevant.
It is time to end the theoretical debate over
whether we are seeking a new order or Improving
the existing one. Let us deal in reality, not
rhetoric. 79
One addition to the measures which the U.S. was willing to
support In regard to commodities trade was the review of
mechanisms for stabilization of earnings, similar to the
STABEX scheme of the Lome Convention. The IMF facility was
seen as a base for expansion, so that export earnings of
developing countries could be offered greater protection
from sharp fluctuation.
A crucial area where the U.S. was prepared to offer
73. United Nations Press Release IB/3534.
74. U.S. Mission to the U.N. Press Release, Address
by Henry A. Kissinger before the OECD Ministerial Council,
Paris, May 28, 1975, at 5.
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development assistance was in the solution of the world food
problem. The U.S. pledged continuing food aid of 4 million
tons per year, and also pressed for long term solutions by
the creation of international grain reserves and increasing
production of food in developing countries. The U.S. pro-
posed the creation of an International Fund for Agricultural
Development to be administered by an organization created by
the World Food Conference, (the Consultative Group on Food
Production and Investment), to apply technology for Improv-
ing agriculture in developing countries.
While the area of food was one in which the U.S. could
make a great contribution by virtue of Its large production
and technological advancement, again in appealing to the
poorest nations the U.S. was suspected of acting to break
the solidarity of the Group of 77, rather than for altruis-
tic reasons. Specifically, it was felt that while charity
was laudable, as long as underlying structural inequities
were not dealt with, world poverty would only continue to
worsen.
5. Position of United Kingdom and the Netherlands
Pressure was placed on the U.S. to adopt a more forth-
coming position towards the NIEO by various other Indus-
trialized countries. Some OECD partners, more dependent
upon supply of raw materials from developing countries than
the U.S., perceived a greater immediate risk from the escala-
tion of confrontation between North and South. The United
Kingdom and the Netherlands in particular took special pains
to enter into dialogue with developing countries.
At a meeting of heads of government of the Commonwealth
countries at Kingston, Jamaica on May 1, 1975, Harold Wilson
outlined a proposal for a general agreement on commodities
which the U.K. would be willing to enter as part of "a new
deal in world economies. 75 Although the U.K. recognized
that tackling the commodity question alone was not a suf-
ficient response to the demands by developing countries for
a NIEO,76 by singling out this issue for attention, the U.K.
was following the sentiment of many developing countries.
The problem of commodities trade has formed a focus for
75. "World Economic Interdependence and Trade in Com-
modities," presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister,
May 1975, at 1.
76. A.R.K. Mackenzie, Minister of Economic and Social
Affairs, U.S. Mission to the U.N. at a meeting of the U.N.
Association of the U.S. on June 11, 1975, 345 E. 46th Street,
New York, N.Y.
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many of the provisions of the NIEO resolutions for several
reasons. Developing countries are dependent upon the export
of commodities to earn more than two-thirds of their for-
eign exchange for the financing of development. The wide
fluctuation of prices and decline In value of important
commodities such as coffee, tea, rubber, and jute7 7 has
aroused the concern of developing countries. In addition,
the success of OPEC countries in forming a producer asso-
ciation and the potential bargaining leverage to be ob-
tained in this way served as a stimulus to exporters of
other commodities. The developments In consultations
among developing countries on the establishment of an In-
tegrated series of commodity agreements will be explored in
a later section.
The U.K. did not support the multi-commodity approach
called for by developing countries, but nonetheless was
able to announci support for such demands as joint financing
of international buffer stocks by consumers as well as pro-
ducers and stabilization of export earnings. The U.K. had
hoped that by obtaining a general approach to the negoti-
ation of commodity agreements, the particular problems posed
by each commodity agreement would be more easily solved.
This would be a compromise between the multi-commodity ap-
proach and the insistence by consumer countries that com-
modity agreements be negotiated on a case-by-case method.
Similarly, the U.K. sought to soften the controversy
surrounding the indexation of commodity prices to the
prices of manufactured goods imported by developing coun-
tries. While not dismissing the proposal out of hand, the
technical difficulties surrounding the approach were pointed
out. Thus, the problem in identifying a common base or date
of reference for prices due to varying price cycles was men-
tioned. Also, unequal benefits among developing countries
would result from any given system due to endowment of re-
sources, so that the poorest countries would more often
than not receive the least revenue. The suggestion was put for-
ward that commodity prices should be formed by market
forces, subject to regulation within a range to be nego-
tiated. While earnings would thus be protected from wide
fluctuation, the problem of long-term price decline would
be approached through income stabilization schemes similar
to the STABEX scheme introduced in the Lome Convention.
77. UNCTAD, TD/B/C.1/166/Supp.l/Add.l, December 13,
1975, Annex III, at 5.
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The U.K. published a booklet which included a detailed
analysis of world trade in commodities and background in-
formation on the operation of existing commodities arrange-
ments in addition to the proposals outlined above.7 8 Al-
though the U.K. was not prepared to answer many of the de-
veloping countries' demands, it demonstrated that it was
interested in entering into serious discussion at the
Seventh Special Session, if not at a special conference on
commodities which it also proposed.
The Netherlands also made considerable efforts to open
a dialogue between industrialized nations and developing
countries. As a small nation with an economy heavily de-
pendent upon international trade, Holland is In an es-
pecially vulnerable position vis-a-vis confrontation with
the third world. Holland has nevertheless, or perhaps for
that very reason, been largely sympathetic to demands by
developing countries for an equitable international system.
The Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, Jan P.
Pronk, has taken a protagonistic position towards the NIEO,
and he was selected as Chairman of the ad hoc committee at
the Seventh Special Session to oversee negotiations between
developing and developed countries. An international sym-
posium on a NIEO was convened by Jan Pronk at The Hague be-
tween May 22 and 24, just before the OECD meeting. At-
tended by American policy-makers as well as international
experts, the symposium considered the problems facing the
international community arising from the distribution of
world income, and sought long-term solutions on finance,
scarcity, trade, decision-making, and adjustments in de-
veloping countries.
Also sponsored by the Dutch government, a project
called "Reviewing the International Order" began work in
October 1974. The project combined input from 20 spe-
cialists from developing and developed countries In pre-
paring an interim report in June 1975, which was hoped
would "prove of value in furthering discussions on the
[NIEO] during the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly."79 The RIO made recommendations for nine
problem areas, including raw materials, income redistrlbu-
78. 'World Economic Interdependence and Trade in Com-
modities" May 1975, 109 pages.
79. "Reviewing the International Order Interim Re-
port," prepared during the Second General Meeting Held
17-20 June 1975,in Rotterdam, at 4.
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tion, the international monetary system, and international
division of labor. The analysis was predicated upon the
realization that even with stringent positive assumptions
that no limit to world food production exists, a per capita
Increase in incomein the developing world of 5% per year,
and 3.3% per year in the developed world, and low popula-
tion forecasts of the U.N., it would take 40 years to re-
duce the ratio of income between rich and poor countries
from 13:1 to 6:1.
B. Policy of Group of 77
The Group of 77 held a series of meetings beginning In
early 1975, which enabled them to arrive at a common nego-
tiating position vis-l-vis the developed countries. While
these meetings were not strictly defined in terms of prepara-
tions for the Seventh Special Session, it became clear that
the Group of 77 had become committed to interaction at a
ministerial level in formulating a consistent set of de-
mands. It is difficult to discern what trade-offs were ar-
rived at among the Group of 77 in order to find that least
common denominator which would satisfy all partners. The
internal bargaining process remained a matter among members
of the Group of 77; it is significant that ranks were not
broken throughout the process of internal dialogue.
Again, while it is meaningful to examine the immediate
outcome of the series of meetings among the Group of 77
(insofar as formal final reports reflect the actual sub-
stance of the dialogue), the process by which negotiations
took place is of greater significance. An assumption which
enabled participants to muster the necessary political will
to achieve a common position was that only by collective
action could desired structural changes be made in the in-
ternational economic system. The potential for a breakdown
in negotiations was enormous--developing countries encom-
passed a wide range of disparate economic needs, and many
uncertainties accompanied any country's choice to cast its
lot in with others of the Group of 77. A major threat was--
as is true of collective bargaining in general--that any
particular country or group of countries would find greater
chance to have its individual needs met by direct contact
with developed countries. However, if there is one testi-
mony to the emergence of the NIEO it is this: the Group of
77 has recognized the need for a collective approach to
common structural problems shared by developing countries
in the international economic system.
The negotiations by which the Group of 77 formulated a
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common position proceeded in various fora, and indeed at
various points it became difficult to coordinate the deci-
sions taken in New York with those in Geneva and elsewhere.
The problems of delegation of authority became acute in pro-
portion to the extent it was felt that the locus of policy
decision-making had been centralized in the Group of 77. The
more cynical among the Group of 77 believed that the dialogue
vas too remotefrom such substantive economic negotiations as
the multilateral trade negotiations in GATT or the Develop-
ment Committee of the IMF and World Bank,where countries by
and large pursued individual policies. On the other hand,
it was felt by many developing countries that the ultimate
interrelation between development problems (monetary, trade,
Investment) necessitated a coordinated approach only possi-
ble by centralizing decisions In the Group of 77. The com-
mon viewpoint was that an impetus to substantive negotia-
tions between the Group of 77 and industrialized countries
could be provided through a collective posture.
1. The Conference of Developing Countries on Raw
Materials
One means by which OPEC sought to retain support for
the concept of producer associations from other developing
countries was by increasing the possibility for other pro-
ducer associations to follow their success. Accordingly, a
conference was held in Dakar between February 4th and 8th,
1975 to carry out "a detailed analysis of the fundamental
problems of raw materials and development in the light of
recent trends in international economic relations.-BO The
Conference placed the bargaining power of OPEC at the dis-
posal of producers of other conmodities by providing that
no energy talks would be held without simultaneous dis-
cussion of other raw materials. OPEC sought to institu-
tionalize this cooperation by establishing a council of
producer associations and the common financing of a multi-
commodity buffer stock. It was hoped that by linking com-
modities into a common scheme, this would increase the bar-
gaining strength of developing countries. This approach
rested on the assumption that the strength of one producer
association could be used to enhance and reinforce the
strength of exporters of other products.
The tone of the language adopted by the Dakar Con-
80. Conference of Developing Countries on Raw Mater-
ials, Dakar, February 4-8, 1975, E/AC.62/6., at 1.
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ference was far from conciliatory, with wordlnd that would
alienate even friendly audiences in developed countries.
The first enumerated paragraph of the declaration spoke of
"the present structure of international trade, which had
its origins in imperialist and colonialist exploitation,
and which has continued in force up to the present day2 in
most cases through various forms of neo-colonialism.|1o  An
underlying principle for the Group of 77 in changing the or-
ganization of world trade to a just and equitable system
was said to be the need for "combining their forces to
strengthen their negotiating power.||82
An analysis of fundamental inequalities in the inter-
national market trading system was given in a general
declaration. Through tariff structure in the developed
countries, access to markets by developing countries was
denied. In addition, bargaining power in the marketing of
commodities was imbalanced, so that oligopolistic buyers
were able to extract profits from developing countries, com-
peting among themselves for sale of their products. One
focus was the declining terms of trade in prices of primary
commodity exports relative to manufactured imports. Para-
graph 9 referred to long-term deterioration in the net bar-
ter terms of trade, or the purchasing power of developing
countries from export earnings from primary commodities.
In a further refinement of this complaint, a new
measure of the distribution of income between developed and
developing countries was referred to In paragraph 4.83 Ac-
cording to the theory of "factoral terms of trade," the
benefits of increased productivity in a factor entering
Into production in the export sector can also be passed on
to importing countries. When prices decrease at the same
time as factor inputs become more efficient, gains in pro-
ductivity are passed on to developed countries. Thus,
while increased productivity would ordinarily result in an
increase in profits if prices remained the same, benefits of an
Increase in productivity were in fact not retained by develop-
ing countries, although benefits of increased productivity in
manufactured goods were retained by developed countries.
Paragraph 17 listed the areas in which action by de-
veloped countries on commodities had not been forthcoming,
including the failure to enter into commodities agreements
51. Id., at 1-2.
82. Id.
83. Id. , at 3.
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and the failure to open markets to goods from developing
countries. 8 4 Paragraph 23 also pointed to foregone profits
and employment through processing and shipping of develop-
ing countries' raw materials by developed countries.8 5
The Dakar Action Programme called for collective self-
reliance among the Group of 77 to right the structural
problems of the international trading system.'8 6 An elab-
orate scheme was outlined calling for the following action:
-- grant preference to goods from developing
countries (If)
-- cooperate in investment and production
projects (lh)
-- implement prior decisions to exchange tech-
nology, cooperate in monetary trade and In-
dustrial spheres (Ii)
-- set up a council to strengthen cooperation
among producer associations (paragraph 2,
implemented In Resolution VI)
-- establish a multi-commodity buffer stock (4)
-- increase investment in agricultural sector (9)
-- set up regional enterprise for processing of
primary commodities (9)
-- establish regional payments unions (10)
-- examine advisability of joint purchasing
agency for strengthening bargaining power
in buying of patents and licenses (14)
Another strain in the Dakar Action Program outlined
the demands of the Group of 77 for action by developed
countries. This section was worded more moderately, call-
ing for agreement on an integral:ed programme on commodities,
cooperation in reforming the monetary institutions, expan-
sion of trade opportunities for developing countries, and
reform of the international patent system. The import was
that with cooperation by developed countries, the more
provocative elements of the plan for self-help among the
Group of 77 outlined in the previous section would be set
aside.
2. Second Ministerial Meeting of Group of 77
It was not only through obtaining more equitable
prices for the export of raw materials that developing
84. Id., at 6-7.
85. Id., at 9-10.
86. tEnference of Developing Countries on Raw Mater-
ials, Dakar, February 4-8, 1975, E/AC.62/6, at 13ff.
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countries hoped to raise their income. The Group of 77
called for an increase in industrialization both in order
to process their own natural resources for export and in
order to produce manufactured goods for domestic markets as
well. The meeting of Ministers in Algiers from February 15
to 18, 1975 was concerned with formulating the Group of 77's
common position for the Second General Conference of the
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
to be held in Lima in the latter half of March.87 The Group
of 77 formulated a two-pronged approach to industrialization,
with one set of provisions directed to collective self-
reliance and another set directed to policies requiring co-
operation from developed countries.
The text formulated by the Group of 77 in Algiers con-
tained strong provisions, which could be softened in return
for cooperation from developed countries in forthcoming
negotiations. The Declaration and Plan of Action adopted
by the Group of 77 set a target for increasing the share of
developing countries from the present level of 7% to 25% of
world Industrial production by the year 2000. 8  A central
part of the Algiers plan called for negotiations to trans-
fer those industries which, according to criteria of com-
parative advantage or local processing of raw materials,
could be more equitably located In developing countries.
The argument made by the Algiers Conference was that de-
veloping countries would embark on a shift of their trade
pattern. In lieu of the present system where raw materials
were shipped to developed countries for processing and then re-
imported to In developing countries for consumption of the
final product (e.g. Hershey bars), horizontal trade would
be increased among developing countries. The Group of 77
proposed to implement this system unilaterally through trade
preferences if coogeration was not forthcoming from de-
veloped countries.09
87. UNIDO was created in 1966 by the General Assembly
to increase industrialization in developing countries, and
is composed of U.N. members.
88. Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial De-
velopment and Cooperation E/AC.62/4 at 5.
89. Other recommendations were made by the Algiers
Conference:
-- to prevent export of pollution and environ-
mental destruction to developing countries
(paragraph 17)
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The plan of action also set forth principles upon which
developing countries should base national industrialization
policies. It could be questioned, however, whether some of
the policies were not mutually exclusive. For example, with
limited capital resources, a choice would have to be made
between the aim of establishing small, medium-scale and
rural industry (paragraph 23g) or basic petro-chemical,
steel and metallurgical industries (paragraph 23f). In the
section dealing with cooperation among developing countries,
ambitious plans were made to apportion industries (para-
graph C on complementarity of industries) according to
long-term agreements on product special ization (paragraph
I). Plans were also made to share technology through es-
tablishment of coordinating Institutions (paragraphs b and
k).
3. OPEC Heads of State Conference
One month after the Dakar Conference, OPEC Heads of*
State met in Algiers in order to reaffirm the Intention of
oil-producing countries to maintain solidarity with others
In the Group of 77. Provisions adopted In the Dakar Con-
ference were given the explicit approval of OPEC members.
The Conference also directed crlticlsm'to developed coun-
tries for over-reaction to the increase In the price of oil.
Internal differences between OPEC members were Ironed
out by paragraph 8, which provided that all proposals were
to be considered as an "overall programme,1"90 and that no
component could be separated from others for individual Im-
plementation. This would enlist the support of all OPEC
members for the Algerian concern with collective self-
reliance among the Group of 77 and for the Saudi Arabian
concern with monetary reform.
OPEC was careful-to promise assistance to the rest of
the Group of 77 In order to preserve unity of interest.
Paragraph 9 promised financial assistanceto the most affected
-- to regulate and control transnational
corporations (paragraph 20)
-- to encourage producer associations
(paragraph 25)
-- to train local personnel to process Indigenous
raw materials (paragraph 31)
Id., at 7-9.
TU. "Declaration adopted by the Conference of the
Sovereigns and Heads of State of OPEC Member Countries,"
held at Algiers from March 4-6, 1975, E/AC.6215, at 4.
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developing countries, production and supply of fertilizer,
and cooperation with other raw material exporters.9 1 OPEC
countries sought to minimize the threat of increased oil
prices to non-oil producers by the provision in paragraph
10 "to negotiate with the most affected developed countries,
bilaterally or through international organizations, the
provision of financial facilities that allow the growth of
the economies of those countries while ensuring both the
value and security of the assets of OPEC Member Countries."9
2
4. Third Ministerial-Meeting of Coordinating Bureau
of Non-Aligned Countries in Havana and Meeting
of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries
in Lima
The Lima Conference meeting from August 25 to 30, just
prior to the Seventh Special Session was designed to put
muscle behind the demands about the NIEO to be made at the
Seventh Special Session. The Group of 77 was interested
In demonstrating that they were prepared to move forward
in producer associations, buffer stocks, and control of
transnational corporations. Many of the provisions were
designed as a spur to developed countries to negotiate
with developing countries. The plans calling for self-
reliance among the Group of 77 would be implemented uni-
laterally in the event that no progress was made in nego-
tiations with the developed countries.
Agreement was reached at the Conference on a number
of concrete economic provisions, indicating the depth and
precision of the groundwork preceding the Conference. In
addition to informal consultations, a fifteen country
Coordinating Bureau met in Havana to prepare an agenda for
the Lima Conference.
The Group of 77 also moved to consolidate various in-
stitutional arrangements that had grown out of previous
meetings.
Perhaps the most Important provision in this respect
was that paragraphs 153 and 154 called for the establishment
of a Fund for Financing Buffer Stocks. 9 3 This plan was in
reaction to the lack of agreement with developed countries
In UNCTAD to implement the integrated plan for commodities
91. Id., at 4, 5.
92. IT., at 10.
93. T"Development and International Economic Coopera-
tion," A/10217,September 5, 1975, at 44-45.
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that would take consumer interests into account. Thus, the
Group of 77 made it clear that unless financing was forth-
coming from developed countries for the establishment of a
joint fund, producers' associations would administer a fund
on their own. This intent was further elaborated In Reso-
lution XII calling for an agreement to be drawn up not later
than February, and a conference before June 30, 1976.
Another detailed provision was the plan In paragraph
163 and Resolution X to establish a Solidarity Fund for
Economic and Social Development of the Non-Aligned Coun-
tries. The Convention, drafted in Kuwait in January and
approved in Havana by the Coordinating Bureau, was open
for signature until December 31, 1975. Membership in this
fund was to be obtained at an equal subscription rate of
500,000 SDR's, with voluntary contributions above that
amount. The Fund, to be located In Kuwait, would make loans
for financing of development programmes, industrialization,
transfer of technology, export promotion, and technical
assistance. The Fund was seen as a way to cement the grow-
ing bonds of cooperation among the Group of 77 and to pro-
vide an alternative to the dependence of developing coun-
tries upon institutions controlled by developed countries.
In the international monetary sphere, a plan was set
forth In paragraph 171 to expand cooperation among Central
Banks of the Group of 77. A group of representatives from
Central Banks would be established to explore such possi-
bilities as a payments union to lessen developing coun-
tries' dependence upon convertible currency. Transactions
among developing countries could be coordinated through a
central clearinghouse that would operate in a barter
fashion. In the area of international monetary reform,
paragraph 172 authorized the Group of 2495a to "assess the
progress of the international monetary reform and the
situation of the international financing for development,
in the context of the New International Economic Order.94
In addition to the very specific and Immediate pro-
posals for economic action, the Lima Programme endorsed
the long-term goal of the establishment of an International
Trade Organization,'in paragraph 182.95 In the section
calling for cooperation with developed countries, paragraph
186 called for implementation of the Charter of Economic
94. Id., at 49.
95. IT., at 52.
95a. TFe Intergovernmental Group of 24 on International
Monetary Affairs is a coalition of developing countries which
has met eleven times so far at a ministerial level in order
to press for greater awareness of the concerns of developing
countries in monetary reform.
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Rights and Duties of States.96 Other areas where action
from developed countries was called for included assistance
in food production (paragraph 190),97 implementation of the
generalized system of preferences (and denouncing coercive
elements in an obvious reference to the U.S. scheme in
paragraphs 19690 and 19799), and progress In trade liberal-
ization of Imports to developed countries in GATT (para-
graph 198).100
The Group of 77 had shown by the preparations for the
Seventh Special Session that they were capable of arriving
at common positions in a number of substantive areas. The
potential schism between the poorest of the developing coun-
tries and the oil producers had been averted through special
concessions granted them in the areas of loan facilities
and accordance of priority to their needs. International
consultations had been intensified through the creation of
both formal and informal networks which would enable the
developing countries to enter into a process of collective
bargaining on the NIEO with developed countries.
III. Negotiations on the New International Economic Order
A. Preparations for the Seventh Special Session
The dialogue between North and South on the NIEO con-
tinued In the various international economic arenas which
met in 1975. Such U.N. subsidiary organs as UNCTAD, UNIDO,
and various committees of the Economic and Social Council
became caught up in the preparations for the Seventh Spe-
cial Session. The General Assembly had called upon the U.N.
system to put the provisions of the Sixth Special Session
into effect.lOl Accordingly, the scope of consultations
96. Id., at 53.
97. Id., at 55.
98. IT., at 56.
99. IT.
100. IT., at 57.
101. TWe U.N. system had been specifically instructed
by the 57th Session of the Economic and Social Council to
Issue progress reports on implementation of the resolutions
passed at the Sixth Special Session (E/Res./1911 of August
2, 1974). Furthermore, a mid-term review and appraisal of
the International-Development Strategy for the decade of
the 1970's had been scheduled for 1975. (A/Res.2626 XXV).
Thus, voluminous reports were prepared by various U.N. agen-
cies which analyzed the current economic situation of de-
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between developed and developing countries in U.N. bodies
was expanded to include consideration of underlying struc-
tural problems within the United Nations system which re-
lated to implementation of the NIEO.
Negotiations that were taking place between developed
countries and developing countries in arenas affiliated
with the U.N., such as the International Monetary Fund and
GATT, also became incorporated in the Seventh Special Ses-
sion's deliberations on the NIEO. Although the General
Assembly was not equipped to deal with the technical issues
raised in negotiations, it was hoped that impetus and direc-
tives would be given by the General Assembly to overcome
veloping countries, and the work being done to implement
both the old IDS and the new Declaration and Programme of
Action.
Report of the Secretary-General, "Implementation of the
Declaration and the Programme of Action on the Establishment
of a New International Economic Order: Activities of Organ-
izations of the U.N. System,"E/5629, 3 March 1975.
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 'World Eco-
nomic Survey,"1974, Part One, "Mid-Term Review and Appraisal
of Progress in the Implementation of the I)S,"E/5665, ST/
ESA/26, New York 1975.
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "World Eco-
nomic Survey," 1974, Part Two, "Current Economic Developments,"
E/5681 and Add.], Add.2, Add.3, May 9,1975.
"Consideration of Appropriate Changes in the Overall
Pattern of International Economic Relations in the Light of
the Constraints of a General Policy Nature on the Imple-
mentation of the Programme of Action on the Establishment of
a New International Economic Order, for the Achievement of
which the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States is
One," E/AC.62/8, May 5,1975.
"Mid-term Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of
the International Development Strategy; Implementation of
the Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment
of a New International Economic Order; Special Session of
the General Assembly Devoted to Development and Internation-
al Economic Cooperation" TD/B/530, January 20,1975; TD/B/
530/Add.1 (Part I) February 3, 1975, (Part ii) February 6,
1975; and Annex 2, February 1975, Add.2, February 3,1975.
Committee for Development Planning, "Report on the
Eleventh Session," Supplement No. 4, April 7-16,1975, E/5671.
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bottlenecks in the negotiations taking place In other fora.
Thus, the high diplomatic level of the Seventh Special Ses-
sion could facilitate negotiations being pursued on parallel
tracks.
In general, developing countries took a structural ap-
proach to the economic problems under consideration. The
specific content of the negotiations between North and South
will be examined in the context of particular provisions in
the Seventh Special Session Resolution. Although the de-
veloping countries were prepared to accommodate broad de-
mands to a piecemeal implementation, they did not lose
sight of the overall need for a NIEO. Polarization and con-
frontation had given way to a dogged pursuit of partial
measures. It was reasoned that movement in the right direc-
tion could eventually add up to long-term progress.
If the need for change is now recognized all
round, it is conceded also that change will
have to be brought about in an orderly and
step-by-step manner and with the consent and
cooperation of all concerned. 102
The need for the Seventh Special Session to achieve
substantive agreement on many of the thorny conflicts be-
tween North and South was somewhat alleviated by the
scheduling of the Paris Conference on International De-
velopment Cooperation to be held after the Special Sessions
in December. The assurance that the foreign ministers of
twenty-seven developed and developing countries would even-
tually meet to discuss raw materials, energy, development,
and financial affairs had a soothing effect on many de-
veloping countries. Expectations for finding agreement were
transferred to the Paris Conference, thus lessening the
pressure on the Seventh Special Session.
In any case, the developing countries had not expected
the Seventh Special Session to resolve all the issues
slated for consideration at the Fourth Conference of UNCTAD,
to be held in Nairobi, Kenya in May 1976. It had been
hoped, however, that a mandate could be given to UNCTAD In
such areas as commodities, debt renegotiations, and a code
of conduct for the transfer of technology, so that prepara-
tions would advance far enough to result in concrete agree-
ment at the Conference.
102. Iqbal A. Akhund, Press Release ECOSOC 3817,
August 1,1975, at 2.
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Preparations for determining the procedure and agenda
of the Seventh Special Session had been charged to the Eco-
nomic and Social Council, whose 54 members held their 59th
session between July 2 and 31. In the annual debate on eco-
nomic and social policy, the tone of many speeches was gen-
erally conciliatory, reaffirming the need for consensus.
The U.S. statement delivered by Ambassador Clarence Ferguson
on July 7th recognized this need.
My government Is most happy to join with all
those governments who hold to the belief that
true consensus regarding solutions is the only
viable outcome of our deliberations. 103
However, it was also clear that great distance remained
between the various-positions. Agreement was found only in
the rudimentary position that developed countries were pre-
pared to enter negotiations. "As our varied positions
emerge, we will be prepared to en a e in the dialogue and
negotiations we all contemplate."104 Developing countries
on their part tempered the tone of their speeches in antici-
pation of the shift in American policy promised by the
Kissinger speeches.
1. Fourth Session of Committee on Natural Resources
One area which reflected the considerable distance be-
tween developed and developing countries was the dispute
concerning permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
This dispute was reopened in the Council through the con-
sideration of a resolution which had been drafted by the
Committee on Natural Resources, which had met in Tokyo from
March 24th to April 4th. The resolution drafted by the
Committee had been Inspired by the Sixth Special Session.
The inevitable dispute which consideration of this resolu-
tion would touch off was sought to be avoided by the
Netherlands delegation. They moved for the Committee to
abandon this discussion,105 but to no avail. The Committee
referred the draft resolution to the Council, which adopted
it by a vote of 24 in favor to 7 against, with 5 absten-
tions.10 6
The draft resolution was worded even more strongly
103. Press Release USUN-75 (75), at 3.
104. Id., at 5.
105. Committee on Natural Resources, "Report on the
Fourth Session:' E/5663, at 30.
106. Press Release ECOSOC/3790, July 17, 1975, at 1.
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than comparable provisions In the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States. Not only was settlement of
disputes over nationalization deemed a matter for domestic
jurisdiction, but it was explicitly stated that compensa-
tion and mode of payment should be determined by the host
country.
[The Economic and Social Council (2)] re-
affirms that the application of the principle
of nationalization carried out by States, as
an expression of their sovereignty In order
to safeguard their natural resources, implies
that each State is entitled to determine the
amount of possible compensation and the mode
of payment, and that any disputes which might
arise should be settled in accordance with
the national legislation of each State carry-
ing out such measures. 107
Another provision of the resolution re-emphasized that
measures which coerced directly or indirectly those States
exercising sovereign rights over natural resources were In
violation of the U.N. Charter and the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States.
The U.S. response to the draft resolution was over-
whelmingly negative. "The [U.S.] representative stated
that [the] draft resolution . . . was completely, wholly,
and totally unacceptable to his delegation."10 8
2. The Preparatory Committee for the Special
Assembly Session
One of the most important functions of the Council was
to prepare an agenda and proposals to serve as a basis for
negotiations at the Seventh Special Session. In August
1974 the Council delegated this task to the Preparatory
Committee [E/Res./1911 (LVII)]. The Committee held two one-
week sessions in March and June. Most of the work in nar-
rowing the areas for negotiation was accomplished in in-
formal meetings of the Group of 77 in New York. By May 1,
an agenda was proposed which gave a "very restricted and
selective list of areas and questions [deserving priority]
to be used for preliminary contacts between the representa-
tives of the Group of 77 and those of the other groups."10 9
107. Id., Draft Resolution Ill, at 7-8.
108. Committee on Natural Resources, E/5663, at 31.
109. Conference Room Paper No. 1, May 1,1975, at 1.
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Five issues were listed and defined in sub-categories: inter-
national trade (including commodities and access to markets);
transfer of real resources for financing the development of
developing countries and International monetary reform;
science and technology; industrialization; and restructuring
of the economic and social sectors of the U.N. system.
The narrowing of areas for negotiation received a
favorable response from developed countries. At the OECD
Ministerial Meeting of May 28th, "Emlinisters . . . ex-
pressed their willingness to discuss with the developing
countries the relevant Issues, with particular emphasis on
food production, energy, commodities and development as-
sistance for the most seriously affected countries." 110
The U.S. issued a proposed agenda on June 13th, for the
second session of the Preparatory Committee, which met from
June 16 through 20. Five itemswere given: international
commodity trade; international food needs; transfer of
financial resources; problems of poorer developing countries;
and structural'change in the U.N. system. Thus, there was
considerable overlap between the U.S. and Group of 77 pro-
posals. By the end of the meeting, it was agreed that the
Special Session should have one committee of the whole, and
a series of ad hoc working groups.111
During the early part of the summer, informal meetings
were held by the Group of 77 internally as well as with in-
dustrial countries in order to formulate a text upon which
to base negotiations. The process of arriving at agreement
was laborious, as after each consultation with developed
countries it was necessary to renegotiate a common position
among the Group of 77. By the end of the June meeting a
preliminary text had been drafted that needed to be sent
back to the national capitals of the developing countries
for approval. This strategy repeated the procedure used in
the Sixth Special Session: to arrive at a common position
before beginning negotiations with developed countries, in
order to provide an incentive for reaching consensus during
the final negotiation. The Preparatory Committee adjourned
for two months in order to have time to finalize the pro-
posed text.
At the Economic and Social Council meeting in Geneva
the agenda was finalized: the U.S. proposal was accepted
to add food and agriculture to the list of items to be
110. OECD Declaration of Ministers of May 28, 1975.
111. Press Release GA/DEC/17, August 13,1975. Plans
were also made to have night meetings during the Special
Session in order to accommodate all speakers in the two
week duration.
150 [VOL.2
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
covered by the Special Session, bringing the number of top-
ics for the General Assembly's consideration up to six. The
Council also recommended that the Special Session should
adopt, on a priority basis, "concrete and positive decisions
on all the issues enumerated . . . which would make a posi-
tive impact on further negotiations for the establishment of
a new international economic order."1112
When the Preparatory Committee met for its third session
on the 18th of August, it had before it the position paper
of the Group of 77, to which a section on food and agricul-
ture had been appended.l1 3 Proposals made by East Germany
regarding the importance of the State sector, by the Nether-
lands dealing with emergency relief, and by the U.S. out-
lining a global approach to long-range food needs were sub-
mitted as well. While'the E.E.C. was prepared to enter pre-
liminary negotiations in such areas as industrialization,
U.S. diplomats were unable to proceed, pending resolution
of the position to be taken by Henry Kissinger.l14
B. Process of Negotiations
The Seventh Special Session opened on September 1,
1975, with the commencement of formal addresses to the
General Assembly. The U.S. speech was read by Ambassador
Moynihan on September 1, 1975, since Henry Kissinger was
involved at that point with putting the finishing touches
on the Sinai disengagement pact. By the time the general
debate had concluded on September l1th, 108 speeches had
been delivered.
The actual negotiations at the Seventh Special Session
took place in an ad hoc committee. This committee met on
September 2 for its first session, where it elected Jan
Pronk, Minister of Development Cooperation of the Nether-
lands, as its Chairman. Negotiations started on September
4th, but serious talks could not begin until the U.S.
delegation was ready to participate on September 8th.
The U.S. delegation had not received specific instruc-
tions prior to the final formulation of the Kissinger
speech, which was being fought out between the Treasury
and State Departments up until the last minute. When
Kissinger arrived on September 5th, he stated to the dele-
112.E/Res. 1980 (LIX) in Press Release ECOSOC/3818,
August 1, 1975, at 5.
113. E/AC.62/L.4, August 11, 1975,and Add. 1,
August 14,1975.
14. U.N.A.-U.S.A., "The Seventh Special Session of
the U.N. General Assembly," at 4.
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gation in no uncertain terms that he did not want a repeat
of the history of-the Sixth Special Session. 115 The dele-
gation drafted a working paper consisting of a patchwork
quilt of U.S. proposals from the September 1 speech, watered-
down provisions of the Group of 77 draft resolution, and
parts of an E.E.C. text.11 6 This American text, known as
Working Paper No. 10, was used as the basis of neqotiations
for the U.S. position in the ad hoc committee's working
groups.
Various working groups struggled to find a compromise
text. The working group on science and technology, chaired
by Diallo of Upper Volta, was able to find agreement with-
out too much difficulty. The negotiators for the Group of
77 were technically expert, while the competence of some
U.S. officials was called into question at various points. 117
By September 12th, the date scheduled for conclusion
of the Seventh Special Session, agreement was still not in
sight in crucial areas, and the Session was extended. On
the final weekend Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs, who was known to take a hard-
line stance toward development issues, and Ambassador
Moynihan met with a delegation from the Group of 77, headed
by Manuel Perez Guerrero of Venezuela. At that point, the
U.S. retreated visibly from positions taken in Working
Paper No. 10 that had been the basis of negotiations in the
ad hoc committee. U.S. approval of a provision formulated
by the E.E.C. confirming prior commitments to meet the of-
ficial development assistance target of 0.7% was retracted1 18
along with a provision which would have authorized the IMF
and World Bank to examine "the proposed link between the
issue of SDR's and development assistance."ll9
This shift in stance again called into question the
ability of the U.S. to adopt a coherent policy from which
115. U.N.A.-U.S.A., "The Seventh Special Session,
September 1-16, 1975," at 7.
116. Position of the E.E.C. and its Member States,
A/AC.175/2, September 4, 1972.
117. In negotiations dealing with expansion of the
IMF buffer stock facility, the U.S. official was not aware
that current rules prevented the use of funds by producer
associations.
118. Working Paper No. 10, September 8,1975, at 6.
119. Id., at 6.
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negotiations in good faith could be made. A considerable
number of the Group of 77 were at that point in favor of
adopting the original text, which had been written prior to
negotiations. Only with great difficulty was it possible
for more moderate factions in the Group of 77 to prevent the
abandonment of attempts to find consensus. Only one hour be-
fore the final drafting of Resolution 3362 (S-VII) at 4:00
a.m. on September 16 did the Group of 77 decide to adopt a
consensus document.12O The extent of the consensus was
again conditional, however. Some wording was not acceptable
to the U.S. or other industrial nations, and these objec-
tions were to be read into the record of the Special Ses-
sion.
C. Substance of Negotiations
In viewing the substantive outcome of the Seventh Spe-
cial Session, it must be recalled that the negotiations
represented part of the process of dialogue between North
and South. It was as if a single frame In a moving pic-
ture were held up for examination. The configuration of
forces between North and South would thus be "frozen" for
the instant which the General Assembly was examining. The
topics under consideration had been dealt with previously in
other fora, and it was expected that negotiations on these
issues would continue at the Paris Conference, in UNCTAD,
in the World Bank, and in GATT. One delegate referred to
the function of the Seventh Special Session as that of a
traffic cop, granting right of wa to various issues, and
halting the progress of others.12
In order to understand the compromises worked out at
the Seventh Special Session, it is therefore necessary to
consider prior negotiations carried on in other organiza-
tions, and to follow the delegation of these issues by the
General Assembly to other fora for further resolution. How-
ever, it is not possible to examine in depth all of the is-
sues involved at the Seventh Special Session. Rather than
covering the entire range of issues in a cursory manner,
the most controversial issues have been selected for de-
tailed analysis. The overall tenor of the Seventh Special
120. "U.N. Adopts Plan for Poor Nations," N.Y. Times,
September 16, 1975, at 9, col. 1.
121. Francisco Gonzalez de Cossio, Adviser, Economic
Affairs, Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations,
at meeting of U.N.A.-U.S.A. of June 11, 1975.
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Session should become apparent through this selective analy-
sis, since the trend and direction of the negotiation proc-
ess is easily discernible in the progress made in key areas.
1. International Trade
International trade issues were among the most thorny
in the dialogue between North and South on the NIEO. De-
veloping countries complained of built-in inequalities
which prevented them from equal access to markets, and which
forced steadily declining terms of trade and wide fluc-
tuations in earnings from commodity exports. Developing
countries set forth a convincing construct which outlined
the various means through which their economies were ad-
versely affected by the present system. An important vic-
tory for the developing countries was in convincing de-
veloped countries that the ravages of inflation besetting
the international economic system stemmed from "the secular
inflationary trend in the developed market economies.",122
Economists examining the relative significance of infla-
tionary impulses concluded that many developing countries
were not in a position to alleviate the impact which Infla-
tion, transmitted through Integrated capital markets, was
having on their economies.
a. Terms of Trade
Another inherent imbalance in the international econ-
omy was viewed to be long-term deterioration in the terms
of trade of the developing countries' raw material exports,
in relation to their imports of manufactured goods. Al-
though there was some dispute whether there had in fact been
a long-term decline in the terms of trade, 123 a study of net
barter terms of trade showed an average annual decline be-
tween 1952 and 1972 of 2.2%.12 4
In order to remedy declining terms of trade, develop-
ing countries called, in the working paper, for indexation
"of the prices of commodity and raw material exports from
122. Report of the Expert Group over Inflationary
Processes in the International Economy and their Impact on
Developing Countries, TD/B/579, at 5.
123. "U.N. Officials Defer Comment on Report Denying
Price Gaps," N.Y. Times, May 27, 1975 at 8, col. 3, and
Press Release No. 3916 of May 27,1975.
124. Terms of Trade of Developing Countries, UNCTAD/
CD/Misc. 60 at 4.
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developing countries to the prices of their Imports from
developed countries." 125 Neither the E.E.C. nor the U.S.
was prepared to go along with indexation. The E.E.C. pro-
posed that prices should be achieved "which are fair for
consumers and remunerative for producers" and which "en-
courage a long-term equilibrium between expanding produc-
tion and increasing consumption. "126 The U.S. in turn pro-
posed "appropriate and practical approaches that protect
the interests and advance the well-being of producers and
consumers." 127 The outcome of the negotiations on indexa-
tion was for the Secretary-General of UNCTAD to continue
study of "direct and indirect indexation schemes and other
options with a view to making concrete proposals before the
Conference at its fourth session.1l2 8 The U.S. made it
clear in the formal reservations read by Ambassador Jacob
Myersonon September 16 that It would not go along with in-
dexation.
It was proposed that commodity prices be
"indexed"--that is, fixed by agreement and
augmented as prices for industrial goods
rise. We have agreed to join others in the
study of such a proposal. However, the
United States has to make clear it does not
support such a proposal. 129
b. Integrated Programme for Commodities
The Group of 77 also proposed to deal with problems of
trade through regulation of the raw material market, with
an integrated programme for commodities.130 Developing
125. A/10003/Add.1 Annex 1, Part 1, at 2.
126. A/AC.176/2, paragraph 9.
127. Working PaperNo.10, submitted by U.S., Ad Hoc Com-
mittee of the Seventh Special Session, at 3.
128. A/Res/3362, at 3.
129. Press Release USUN-93 (75), at 2.
130. In fact, the regulation of commodities trade
through international agreements has been a long-standing
approach to problems of price fluctuation and level. The
first agreement between producers and consumers was the
1933 Wheat Agreement, which functioned only for a short
time. Earlier schemes for regulation of commodity trade
were producer cartels in coffee, sugar and tea dating prior
to World War II. Only five products have had producer and
consumer commodity agreements: coffee, cocoa, sugar, wheat
and tin. At present, only the International Tin Agreement
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countries felt that an integrated approach was necessary
since price levels of commodities and the failure to nego-
tiate new agreements (in 10 years only one new agreement was
negotiated) made it necessary "to study the problem of com-
modities within the general economic framework, and to tackle
It In a new spirit and with new methods."13 1
In view of the increased international attention to com-
modities problems, the 87 member UNCTAD Committee on Com-
modities scheduled three sessions for 1975. The first meet-
ing, held between February 10th and 13th in Geneva, con-
sidered a proposal for an integrated approach to commodity
agreements. The proposal was composed of five components:
international commodity stocks; a common fund; multilateral
commitments; compensatory arrangements; and the processing
of raw materials and foodstuffs. 132 The plan, as originally
outlined, would have provided for a system of buffer stocks
in 18 commodities Including wheat, maize, rice, sugar, cof-
fee, cocoa, tea, cotton, Jute and manufactures, wool, hard
fibres, rubber, copper, lead, zinc, tin, bauxite, alumina,
and iron ore. The cost of stocking these commodities was
estimated at $10.7 billion. This proposal was considered by
the Committee to be a "useful basis" for further work.
At the second meeting of the committee, beginning on
July 21, a revised proposal was submitted for consideration! 33
This new proposal identified five "core" commodities for
which buffer stocks should be established in the near future:
coffee, copper, rubber, tea and tin. An additional five com-
and the International Cocoa Agreement are operating effec-
tively. A fifth tin agreement was renegotiated in a Confer-
ence between May 20 and June 21, 1975, and it will enter Into
force on July 1, 1976 after ratification. The International
Cocoa Agreement, which came into force in June 1973, will
expire in September 1976. In six other commodities the
possibility of producer-consumer arrangements are currently
under consideration: sugar, coffee, wheat, copper, rubber
and cotton.
131. Mr. Corea, 8th Session of Committee on Commodi-
ties, February 10-13, 1975 TD/B/C.I/SR 118, at 4.
132. UNCTAD TD/B/C.l/166 and supplements 1-5.
133. TD/B/C.l/184 through 187.
[VOL.2
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
modities were suggested for possible inclusion in a more ex-
tended program: sugar, cotton, cocoa, jute and manufactures,
and hard fibres. A common fund of $2.75 billion was pro-
posed to finance the purchase of buffer stocks. Three al-
ternatives for the financing of this fund were given: I) a
tripartite structure, with contributions from exporting,
importing, and OPEC countries; 2) equal capital shares, with
exporting and importing countries paying an equal share; and
3) exporters' majority capital shares, with importing coun-
tries contributing less than half of the required funds. In
all three schemes, provision was made for financing to be
divided into two parts: capital (paid-up, needed for dis-
bursement and commitments) and loans (paid-up, needed for
disbursement, and commitments). It was proposed that one-
third of the capital be obtained on a subscribed basis with
no interest rate and another third on concesslonal terms.
The IMF buffer stock facility was suggested as a source of
low-interest loans. Very low income countries were expected
to contribute only nominally to the capital subscription.
Behind the proposal for the joint financing of a com-
mon buffer stock by both developing and developed countries
was the threat that the Group of 77 would be prepared to
implement the scheme unilaterally through producer asso-
ciations if developed countries were not willing to partici-
pate. Advanced consultations among producers of coffee,
bananas, natural rubber, copper, bauxite and iron have taken
place, and agreements to restrict production have been made
by coffee-producing countries (Cafe Mondial), copper-
producing developing countries (International Council of
Copper-Exporting Countries-- CIPEC) and the Association of
Natural Rubber Producing Countries.134
Developing countries threatened to finance a common
buffer stock unilaterally if support was not forthcoming
from developed countries. In the case of a buffer stock
financed primarily by exporting countries, rules for opera-
tion would not take consumer nations into account. This
134. There has been much speculation about the poten-
tial for producing countries to raise the price of their
exports through concerted action. One article comes to the
conclusion that only in the cases of timber, copper, and
iron ore is this feasible.
Ernest Stern and Wouter Tims, "The Relative Bargaining
Strengths of the Developing Countries," American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, May 1975.
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would mean limitation of supply in order to raise prices.
Oil producing countries would be prepared to provide capital
for such a scheme; a precedent for this kind of action was
shown by the assistance given by Venezuela to the Central
American Coffee Producers in 1974. By the end of August,
the Group of 77 had concretized this plan in the Lima
Declaration, which called for a Conference before June 30,
1976 to establish a fund for financing buffer stocks.
The second part of the Committee on Commodities con-
cluded with a mandate to UNCTAD's Secretary-General to hold
"periodic and informal consultations" with governments in
order to further elaborate the integrated programme in time
for the third meeting of the committee scheduled for the
9th through 19th of December 1975.135
The U.S. position on commodities agreements was not al-
together consistent. While the State Department had in-
timated that a more favorable look was being given to com-
modities agreements, the Treasury Department undermined this
position. In his speech at the OECD on May 28th, Henry
Kissinger stated the following:
The time is ripe for a detailed look at problems
of commodity trade--for solutions that will bene-
fit producers and consumers alike. . . . [W]e do
not believe that exclusive producers organizations
are the best way to solve the commodity problem.
In our view consumers and producers should
jointly discuss their problems and possible
remedial actions. We are prepared to do so.
Specifically, we are ready to discuss new ar-
rangements on a case-by-case basis. We have al-
ready made proposals for a new International
Coffee Agreement. We are ready to discuss other
commodities as circumstances warrant. 136
Two weeks later, in testimony to a House Banking Sub-
committee, Assistant Treasury Secretary Gerald Parsky pur-
sued a hard-line tack which 'was tougher in tone than the
recent statements on the subject by Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger." 137 Espousing a free-market philosophy, Mr.
Parsky stated that,"'e must resist any generalized system of
135. Press Release TAD/627, July 30,1975.
136. Speech before the Ministerial Council of the OECD
of May 28, 1975, USUN Press Release at 8.
137. "U.S. to Fight Fixing of Commodity Prices by De-
veloping Nations, Treasury Says," Wall Street Journal,
July 10, 1975, at 2, col. 3.
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commodity agreements aimed at fixing prices." Studies by
a Ford Administration committee examining U.S. policy on
international commodities were cited which concluded that
no agreement was needed in the case of bauxite, copper,
iron ore, lead or zinc. Only tin was seen as a suitable
commodity for an agreement. A new coffee-pricing pact would
be subject to "intense review by the administration." In
this manner, the Treasury Department encouraged developing
countries who were skeptical that the U.S. would participate
in a consumer-producer arrangement to rely upon exclusively
producer associations.
The negotiations on commodities agreements at the
Seventh Special Session resulted in a mandate that UNCTAD's
Fourth Conference should "reach decisions on the improvement
of market structures in the field of raw materials and com-
modities of export interest to the developing countries,
including decisions with respect to an integrated program
and the applicability of elements thereof. "138 The E.E.C.
had consented to a qualified integrated approach in its
position paper: "the instruments (e.g.,commodity agree-
ments) may cover a very wide range and may where necessary
be combined. A choice cannot be made without considering
specific cases." 139 The U.S. on the other hand was only
prepared to "discuss new agreements in individual com-
modities on a case by case basis." 140
Agreement at the Seventh Special Session was obtained
to expand the operation of two facilities at the IMF deal-
ing with commodity trade. One facility, which provided com-
pensatory financing of export revenue fluctuations, was seen
as a possible alternative to indexation. Instead of inter-
fering with market prices, compensatory financing would
guarantee a minimum income to exporters of commodities with
reduced earnings from a decrease in prices. The United
States proposed the establishment of a development security
facility to replace the fund's existing compensatory finan-
cing scheme. Under present rules introduced in 1969 the IMF
138. A/Res/3362 (S-VI1),at 2.
139. A/AC.176/2, paragraph 11.
140. Bureau of Public Affairs, "Global Consensus and
Economic Development," Speech of the Secretary of State at
the United Nations, Bureau of Public Affairs Press Release,
September 1, 1975, at 12.
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facility is intended for members who export primary products
when balance of payments difficulties arise. Borrowing is
limited to 25% of the member's subscription to the IMF, and
calculation of the shortfall is contingent upon sufficient
statistical data. Repayment is on terms similar to the
standard rule of 3-5 years limitation, with charges at nor-
mal rates for IMF transactions--that is, on a graduated
scale from 4% per annum at one year to 6% per annum at four
years.
The development security facility would provide up to
$2.5 billion per year, or a total of $10 billion outstanding
in loans (or an average of 5 years per loan). The loans
could be convertible Into grants under prescribed conditions
for the poorest countries. The grants would be financed
through a trust fund supported by the sale of IMF gold,
another of the U.S. proposals. Loans would not be made at
the expense of normal drawing rights limited by IMF quotas.
In addition, part of the loans would be available auto-
matically, with additional portions subject to balance of
payments conditions and reserves for violent swings in com-
modity earnings. Shortfalls would be calculated In accord-
ance with projected exports, as well as current and past
levels.
Agreement on expansion of the buffer stock financing
facility was not explicit, with the IMF asking merely to
study the possibility of permitting direct assistance to
international buffer stocks. Under present arrangements,
the IMF provides loans for the financing of buffer stocks
to members of international buffer stock schemes, but sub-
ject to stringent conditions:
a) that international arrangements are in accordance
with exporter and importer interests;
b) that arrangements are of medium-term duration;
c) that trade discrimination is not incorporated Into
the schemes;
d) that financing is also forthcoming from sources
other than the facility;
e) that short-term price fluctuations are balanced
around a medium-term price equilibrium; and
f) that long-term supply controls are consistent
with the interests of consumers, i.e., adequate provision
for participation of importers and stability of agreements.
The IMF facility has a capacity to finance buffer stocks
of over SDR 3 billion, but use of the facility has been for
amounts of about SDR 25 million, in connection with finan-
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cing of buffer stocks of the International Tin Agreement and
the International Cocoa Agreement. The condition for lend-
ing that there must be immediate and temporary balance of
payments difficulties introduces uncertainties into avail-
ability of funding. Borrowing for use of buffer stock fi-
nancing eliminates other borrowing rights from the IMF,
limiting the usefulness of the present buffer stock facility.
In addition, the loans, which call for repayment within five
years, are too short, since the price fluctuation cycles of
some products take longer than that period.
The provisions for buffer stocking as finally incor-
porated into the resolution made by the Seventh Special
Session were much less explicit than those called for by
the Group of 77. UNCTAD was called upon to reach decisions
bearing on:
(a) Appropriate international stocking and other
forms of market arrangements for securing stable,
remunerative and equitable prices for commodities
of export interest to developing countries and
promoting equilibrium between supply and demand,
including, where possible, long-term multilateral
commitments;
(b) Adequate international financing facilities
for such stocking and market arrangements. 14l
The IMF was asked to study a relaxation of the rules which
would allow loans to an international buffer stock and not
merely to countries.
[Tihe Fund should expedite its study of the
possibility of an amendment of the Articles of
Agreement, to be presented to the Interim Com-
mittee, if possible in its next meeting, that
would permit the Fund to provide assistance
141. A/Res. 3362 (S-VII), at 2.
The original proposal by the Group of 77 called
for:
Agreement should be reached at the fourth session of
UNCTAD on an integrated programme for commodities .
which should
(i) establish international stocking and market inter-
vention arrangements to support prices at remunerative and
just levels for commodities of export interest to develop-
ing countries;
(ii) create a Special International Fund for finan-
cing of stocking and market intervention arrangements;
... . A/10003/Add.l (Part I) Annex I, at 1.
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directly to International buffer stocks of
primary products. 142
The disagreement on the Integrated commodity scheme to be
considered at UNCTAD IV was taken by the Group of 77 in
stride, perhaps due to their determination to proceed at
all costs, even if by a unilateral implementation. The
Group of 77 is proceeding with the arrangements for a com-
mon fund to finance buffer stocks in accordance with their
resolution to this effect in the Lima Declaration.
c. Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the Generalized
System of Preferences
The developing countries' interest In a re-structuring
of commodity trade also envisioned an expansion of their
capacity to process their own raw materials. However, the
tariff structure in developed countries was seen to frus-
trate the diversification of the economies of the develop-
ing countries and the diminution of their dependence on the
export of raw materials. In industrial countries the tariff
rate tends to rise with the level of processing of the im-
port. Industrial raw materials are generally admitted duty-
free, or at very low rates, while relatively high tariff
rates exist for finished products and moderate tariffs for
semi-manufactures. This discrimination against processed
and manufactured goods is known as "tariff escalation," and
has proved particularly troublesome for developing countries
seeking access to markets for their industrial products.
The U.S. supported a tariff de-escalatlon: "[W]e are
ready to join with other participants in Geneva to negotiate
changes in the system of protection in the industrialized
countries that favors the import of raw materials over other
goods."1 43 However, the reluctance of the E.E.C. to deal with
this issue left the system unchanged.
One factor seen by developing countries as tending to
maintain the present discrimination against products from
developing countries in the existing tariff structure was
the procedural framework of GATT. Due to the bargaining
structure of GATT tariff rounds, where concessions are
traded off among similar markets, tariffs facing developing
countries are on the. average of 50% higher than those levied
142. Id., at 7.
143. Speech of the Secretary of State, Bureau of Pub-
lIc Affairs Press Release, September 1, 1975, at 10.
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on imports from other developed countries. 144 For example,
during the Kennedy Round negotiations in 1967, substantial
cuts were made on products in which developed countries
dominate world trade (chemicals, machinery, transport equip-
ment, etc.), while generally only small tariff cuts were
made on products of major export interest to developing
countries (foods, textiles, leather and leather goods, etc.).
The Seventh Special Session focused on the structure of
the current multilateral trade negotiations in GATT. Al-
though the Tokyo Round officially commenced with the Declara-
tion of Ministers at Tokyo on September 14, 1973, actual
negotiations did not reach a substantive phase until early
1975. One dispute not fully resolved by the Seventh Special
Session was the degree to which developing countries should
be accorded special treatment in the multilateral trade
negotiations. According to the Tokyo Declaration, "priority
attention [was] to be given to products or areas of interest
to developing countries."145 The principle of reciprocity
in conducting negotiations was to be relaxed for developing
countries.
The developed countries do not expect reciprocity
for commitments made by them in the negotiations
to reduce or remove tariff and other barriers to
the trade of developing countries, i.e., the de-
veloped countries do not expect the developing
countries, in the course of the trade negotia-
tions, to make contributions which are incon-
sistent with their Individual development, finan-
cial and trade needs. 146
However, these principles were not in strict agreement
with the most favored nation clause, one of the fundamental
provisions of the GATT. According to Article I, any reduc-
tion in the import duties of a GATT member must be applied
"Immediately and unconditionally" to imports from all other
GATT members. Tariff reductions granted on a m-f-n basis
144. UNCTAD, "The Structure of Protection in the In-
dustrial Countries and Its Effects on the Exports of
Processed Goods from Developing Countries, TD/B/C.2/36,
Table 2, as cited in TD/B/C.l/166, Supp. 5, at 5.
145. Declaration of Ministers at Tokyo on September 14,
1973, at paragraph 5.
146. Id., at paragraph 5.
1975]
164 TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER [VOL.2
cannot be revoked except in certain circumstances specified
under GATT rules. Consequently, the U.S. felt that develop-
ing countries would gain more from m-f-n tariff reductions
than non-binding preferential treatment.
The disagreement was settled according to ambiguous
language in the final resolution: "The multilateral trade
negotiations under way should take fully into account the
particular interests of developing countries with a view to
providing them differential and more favourable treatment In
appropriate cases.147 It was unclear from this language
whether tropical products, singled out by the Tokyo Declara-
tion for priority treatment, constituted such a case. The
French had expressed the view that negotiations should aim
toward a package deal so that progress over tropical products
would be conditioned upon agreement in other areas of the
trade negotiations.
Several other problems in the multilateral trade nego-
tiations were addressed, but not fully resolved, by the
Seventh Special Session. One such area was the safeguard
rules, which, as currently formulated In Article XIX of GATT,
allow for the introduction of protective measures when
"material injury" occurs. Developing countries had called
for a reformulation of the existing rules in order to ensure
the growth of their exports without arbitrary and unnecessary
safeguard measures. However, the final agreement at the
Seventh Special Session provided:
Countervailing duties should be applied only In
conformity with internationally agreed obliga-
tions. Developed countries should exercise
maximum restraint within the framework of inter-
national obligations In the imposition of counter-
vailing duties on the imports of products from
developing countries. l48
Of special Interest in the current round of the multi-
lateral trade negotiations, the issue of non-tariff barriers,
was also the subject of some compromise. The U.S. was handi-
capped in the tariff negotiations inasmuch as Congressional
approval of the elimination of non-tariff barriers was not
granted in the U.S. Trade Act,which authorized the extent of
concessions permitted in these trade negotiations. The text
agreed to at the Seventh Special Session qualified the de-
147. A/Res/3362 (S-VII), at 4.
148. Id.
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mand of the Group of 77 by inserting the condition that
liberalization should be "where feasible and appropriate.'il49
Some accord with respect to the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) was also reached. Developing countries
had called for improvement of the GSP "so as to include all
products of export interest to the developing countries, at
zero rates of duty and without quotas and ceilings or any
other non-tariff barriers."150 Under the present system,
many limitations exist on the effectiveness of GSP schemes
in increasing export earnings of developing countries. Agri-
cultural products are virtually excluded. Many of the in-
dustrial products of particular interest to developing coun-
tries are not covered by the GSP, such as textiles, leather
and petroleum products. Only 22% of the exports from develop-
ing countries directed toward preference-giving countries are
included in GSP schemes.
It was also feared that the advantages derived from
relative tariff preferences under the GSP would erode as
world-wide tariff and non-tariff barriers were reduced un-
der the multilateral trade negotiations. In addition, as
the E.E.C. expanded and a free-trade area in manufactures was
introduced in Western Europe, preferences granted developing
countries under the GSP would become less significant. Aver-
age preference margins granted under the GSP schemes as a
whole vary from 9.0% to 12.0%, and these margins are reduced
as protection levels decline among preference-giving coun-
tries. 151
In calling for an increase of the GSP, many of the Group
of 77 were necessarily abandoning special trade advantages
which they had received as a result of the current trade
configuration. For example, the ACP States enjoying special
privileges under their agreement with the E.E.C. would lose
their relative advantage over other developing coun-
149. "Developed countries should take effective steps
within the framework of multilateral trade negotiations for
the reduction or removal, where feasible and appropriate, of
non-tariff barriers affecting the products of export in-
terest to developing countries on a differential and more
favourable basis for developing countries." Id., at 4.
150. A/10003/Add.1 (Part I) Annex I, at 2.
151. UNCTAD, TD/B/C.5/22, at 38.
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tries by an expansion of the E.E.C.'s GSP scheme. The Group of
77 had found a means to harmonize the interests of develop-
ing countries in calling for simultaneous expansion of other
markets so as to increase trade outlets for all developing
countries. The text adopted at the Seventh Special Session
also incorporated this demand, providing as well that the
GSP would be extended beyond the 10 year period originally
granted.
The Generalized Scheme of Preferences should
not terminate at the end of the period of ten
years originally envisaged and should be con-
tinuously improved through wider coverage,
deeper cuts and other measures, bearing in
mind the interests of those developing coun-
tries which enjoy special advantages and the
need for finding ways and means for protecting
their interests. 152
The Group of 77 had originally demanded that the GSP "should
be applied in a non-discriminatory manner to all developing
countries" 153 in an obvious reference to the U.S. exclusion
of OPEC members from GSP benefits. This language was de-
leted from the resolution.
2. Transfer of Real Resources for Financing the
Development of Developing Countries and Inter-
national Monetary Reform
Of chief concern to developing countries is their
shortage of capital with which to finance development. In
order to increase the flow of capital to developing coun-
tries, the Seventh Special Session considered both volun-
tary financial aid from developed countries and changes in
the structure of the international monetary system. Square-
ly before the General Assembly was a review of the imple-
mentation of the target for flow of financial resources set
by the International Development Strategy. Each developed
country was asked to provide by 1972, or by 1975 at the
latest, a flow of financial resources to developing coun-
tries of at least 1% of Gross National Product. The stra-
tegy provided also that 0.7% was to be in the form of of-
ficial development assistance. The U.S. had only promised
its "best efforts" to meet the target set by the IDS.15 4
152. A/Res/3362 (S-VII), S(pt. 19, 1975, at 4.
153. A/lOOO3/Add.l(Part 1) Annex I, at 3.
IS. U.N.A.-U.S.A.,"Issues,"at 27.
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Developed countries have not been successful in meeting the
IDS target of 0.7% of GNP for official development assistance
(ODA). The flows of ODA to developing countries from indus-
trial members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee
averaged 0.33% of GNP between 1969 and 1973. The U.S.
performance in granting ODA at 0.28% of GNP was con-
siderably below the average.1 5 5
The resolution adopted by the Seventh Special Session
made a distinction between those countries which had con-
sidered themselves bound by the International Development
Strategy to provide 0.7% transfer of official development
assistance and those which had not. On one hand, continued
commitment %!as promised by those countries which had already
recognized the target while commitment was promised from
those countries including the U.S., which had not pledged
the transfer.
Developed countries confirm their continued com-
mitment in respect of the targets relating to the
transfer of resources, in particular the offi-
cial development assistance target of 0.7 per
cent of gross national product, as agreed in the
International Development Strategy for the Second
United Nations Development Decade, and adopt as
their common aim an effective increase in offi-
cial development assistance with a view to achiev-
ing these targets by the end of the decade. De-
veloped countries which have not yet made a com-
mitment in respect of these targets undertake to
make their best efforts to reach these targets in
the remaining part of this decade. 156
The Group of 77, it is to be noted, had originally demanded
implementation of the target in 1978 "by all economically
advanced countries." 15 7 Even with this compromise, the
United States expressed further reservations:
[T]he U.S. fully supports the objective of an
effective increase in official development as-
sistance and intends to increase the level of
its own assistance. It does not, however, con-
155. Financial Flows to and from Developing Coun-
tries, TD/B/C.3(Vll)/Misc.l,at 10.
156. A/Res /3362 (S-VII), at 5.
157. A/10003/Add.l Annex 1,at 3.
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sider the establishment of specific targets as
likely to achieve the intended result. 58
The issue of the debt burden of developing countries
was one of particular interest to the poorest countries.
Service payments on the public debt of 80 developing coun-
tries grew from $2.8 billion in 1965 to $7.3 billion in
1972.159 This meant that nearly half the new gross inflow
of capital was used to service the public debt. The Group
of 77 called for the convening of a conference of major
donor and creditor countries in 1976 "to devise ways and
means of mitigating this burden.h'160
An ad hoc group of governmental expoerts on the debt
problems of developing countries was convened by UNCTAD.
The group recommended that ad hoc meetings be held between
major creditor and developing countries "to examine at the
international level with debtor countries the situation in
a wider context prior to debt re-negotiation in the cus-
tomary fora."l61 The Seventh Special Session did not con-
vene the conference for debt re-negotiation, as had been re-
quested, but shunted the entire issue to UNCTAD IV, which
was to consider "the need for, and the possibility of, con-
vening as soon as possible a conference of major donor,
creditor and debtor countries to devise ways and means to
mitigate this burden."1 62
The remaining issues concerning the international mone-
tary system were simultaneously under consideration at the
Joint Annual Meeting of the IMF and World Bank in Washington
on September 1-5. The General Assembly could only contribute
peripherally to the discussion in that forum. While a number
of monetary issues were considered at the Seventh Special
Session, the major contention.of developing countries that
their interests were not adequately taken into account in the
restructuring and reform of monetary institutions remained
undiminished.
Demands of developing countries for a greater role in
management of the international monetary system have coin-
cided with a major effort in the international community to
restructure and reform monetary institutions since
158. Press Release USUN-93(75), at 2.
159. TD/B/C.3(VII)/Misc.l,at 64.
160. A/10003/Add.l Annex I,at 4.
161. Press Release TAD/631 August 18,1975,at 4.
162. A/Res/3362 (S-VII),at 6.
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August 1971 when the U.S. suspended the gold standard. This
signalled the end of the Bretton Woods system that had func-
tioned since the end of World War II, and exchange rates be-
gan fluctuating from the par values agreed upon by the Fund.
In 1972, efforts to reform the Fund's Articles of Agree-
ment to reflect the existing use of floating exchange rates
resulted in the establishment of the Committee of 20--the
Committee on Reform of the International Monetary System and
Related Issues. However, the Committee abandoned efforts to
find agreement on major changes in June 1974, opting instead
for interim measures and a general evolution towards a new
system. 163 An Interim Committee of the Board of Governors
on the International Monetary System was established to ad-
vise the Fund on reforming the monetary system.
In order to incorporate the issues of development into
reform of the monetary system a special Development Com-
mittee was formed, viz., the Joint Ministerial Committee of
the Board of Governors of the Bank and Fund on the Transfer
of Real Resources to Developing Countries. The Development
Committee was expected to coordinate policy between the Fund,
established to deal with international currency stability,
and the World Bank, established to finance reconstruction
and development of member countries.
A central concern of developing countries in seeking
monetary reform is the difficulty of obtaining hard currency
to finance development. Under the prevailing system, while
developed countries with hard currencies are able to create
international liquidity through expansion of their domestic
monetary supply (through creation of currency, government
deficit spending, etc.), developing countries must depend
upon their export earnings.
Under present rules, SDR's164 are distributed in
proportion to a member's quota in the IMF, further disad-
vantaging developing countries. In the six years, ending
in 1974, that SDR's were in use, developing countries
were allocated 2.1 billion SDR's of the total 9.3 billion
created. 165 Developing countries have pressed for a
163. IMF Survey, June 17, 1974, at 177, and "Outline
of Reform Supplement," June 17, 1974.
164. The special drawing right (SDR), an international
source of liquidity created by the IMF, has been used since
1969 as a supplement to gold in international transactions.
165. U.N.A.-U.S.A., "Issues," at 37.
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link between the creation of SDR's and development assistance,
which would provide an automatic mechanism for their aid.
The Seventh Special Session incorporated a demand for such
a link in the final resolution:
The establishment of a link between the special
drawing rights and development assistance should
form part of the consideration by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund of the creation of new spe-
cial drawing rights as and when they are created
according to the needs of international liquidity. 166
The U.S. objected to this portion of the resolution. 167
Increasing the role of the SDR and limiting the use of
national currencies in international transactions would pro-
vide for more equal access of developing countries to in-
ternational liquidity. Such a system would also prevent a
massive export of inflation as had been caused by U.S.
deficit spending during the Vietnam War, when the U.S. dol-
lar was convertible with gold and used as International cur-
rency. Many developing countries, forced to hold dollar
reserves as international currency, lost a large amount of
capitol with the devaluation of the dollar. The Seventh
Special Session proposed a larger role for SDR's along with
a proportionate reduction in the use of national currencies:
The role of national reserve currencies should
be reduced and the special drawing rights should
become the central reserve asset of the inter-
national monetary system in order to provide
for greater international control over the cre-
ation and equitable distribution of liquidity
and in order to limit potential losses as a con-
sequence of exchange rate fluctuations. 168
The U.S. objected to this provision as well. 169
166. A/Res/3362 (S-VII),at 5.
167. "The U.S. does not subscribe to the paragraph
dealing with the link between special drawing rights and
development assistance. The U.S. position is that it does
not support a SDR-aid link. This position is unchanged,
sir."1 Press Release USUN-93(75), at 2.
168. A/Res/3362 (S-VII),at 7.
169. "We differ with the paragraph dealing with re-
form of the international monetary system. We share the
general objective of placing the SDR in the center of the
international monetary system, but we believe that, in the
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Agreement was reached concerning a compromise on the
disposal of IMF gold reserves (150 million ounces valued at
$6 billion official prices). The agreement, settled in the
Interim Committee on August 31, provided for the allocation
of one-sixth of the gold to developing countries and one-
sixth to member countries according to their quota. Also
agreed on in the Interim Committee meeting was a realloca-
tion of voting rights in the IMF. The voting weight in the
IMF depends upon a country's contribution, or quota. The
reallocation resulted in doubling the voting weight of oil
producers in the IMF 5%to 10% of the total. The voting
weight was redistributed without reducing the quota of other
developing countries, set at about 23%; the U.S. quota,
previously 22.95%, absorbed much of the shift. At the same
time that voting rights were reallocated, the quorum for a
majority was increased to 85%. Thus, the U.S. retained its
veto power, while OPEC countries were accorded a near-veto
as well.
3. Transfer of Technology
Concern for the impact of transnational corporations on
economic development at the Seventh Special Session was in-
corporated into resolutions on transfer of technology. The
Group of 77 had originally channeled their interest in regu-
lation of transnational corporations Into the creation of a
Commission on Transnational Corporationsl70 and an Informa-
tion and Research Center on Transnational Corporations. 171
Political difficulties delayed the appointment of a Director
of the Information and Research Center until the 8th of
August, 1975, when Klaus A. Sahlgren of Finland, a compromise
candidate, was appointed.
Pending the formation of this Center, work had been done
in various other organizations preparatory to drafting a code
of conduct for the transfer of technology. The code was in-
tended to foster an international standard to govern the be-
havior of transnational corporations. Developing countries
supported such a code since they wanted help in enforcing
absence of agreement on all the inter-related components of
a fully reformed international monetary system, it is in-
appropriate to specify selected aims or elements."
Press Release USUN-93(75),at 2.
170. E/Res/1913 (LVIII), December 3, 1974.
171. E/Res/1908 (LVII), August 2, 1974.
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provisions by home countries and desired a common bargaining
position for all developing nations In gaining access to
technology. The developed countries supported the code be=
cause the multinationals were willing to subscribe to a
voluntary code in order to improve the image of overseas
operations.
Three sets of consultations between the U.S. and Latin
American countries on a possible code of conduct occurred,
culminating in November 1974; a fourth meeting was cancelled
by Latin nations in reaction to the exclusion of Ecuador and
Venezuela from GSP benefits. Further attempts to draft Q
code of conduct for transfer of technology were made by
UNCTAD. 172 By May 16, 1975, Brazil submitted a revised code
to the Inter-Governmental Group of Euperts. A major pro-
vision of the code provided that agreements on technology
transfer, including royalty payments, would be subject to
the jurisdiction of the laws of the host country, as would
settlement of disputes. Arbitration would be resorted to
"if the laws applicable to the technology transfer arrange-
ments do not exclude resource to arbitration in this field
and the parties concerned agree to submit their possible
disputes to arbitratIon."1 73 Industrialized countries had
pursued the drafting of a code of conduct in alternative
fora: the international Chamber of Commerce, the OECD, and
the Council of the Americas.
In these discussions, a major dispute arose whether the
code should be voluntary or binding. Opponents of a bind-
Ing code argued that with restrictive provisions, transfer
of technology would not take place, and governments would
not be able to interfere with the operation of private cor-
porations:
We do not believe that the government could
or should establish the terms and conditions
applicable to transfers of technology by its
private sector. 174
172. Pugwash Group's Draft Code of Conduct on Transfer
of Technology TD/B/AC.Il/L.12 and UNCTAD,"Study of the
Possibility and Feasibility of an International Code of
Conduct on Transfer of Technology," TD/B/AC.11/22
173. TD/B/C.6/AC.l/L.i/Rev.J,at 16.
174. Fund for Multinational Management Education rIn
Cooperation with the Council of the Americas, "Analysis of
the Pugwash Working Group's Draft Code of Conduct," Codes
of Conduct for the Transfer of Technology, A Critique, a t 4.
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The Seventh Special Session failed to settle this disagree-
ment, but referred further consultations to UNCTAD IV.
All States should co-operate in evolving an
international code of conduct for the trans-
fer of technology, corresponding, in particu-
lar, to the special needs of the developing
countries. Work on such a code should there-
fore be continued within the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development and con-
cluded in time for decisions to be reached
at the fourth session of the Conference, in-
cluding a decision on the legal character of
such a code with the objective of the adoption of
a code of conduct prior to the end of 1977. 175
The U.S. reiterated its opposition to a binding code
in reservations made at the end of the Seventh Special
Session.
We support work on international guidelines
for the transfer of technology, including most
especially the progress being achieved at
UNCTAD. We do not believe that adoption of
a legally binding code of conduct is the path
to pursue, and we do not read the resolution
as so indicating. 176
4. Industrialization
The Seventh Special Session also discussed the desire
of developing countries to increase their industrialization.
Several proposals were endorsed which had been made at the
Second General Conference of UNIDO in Lima, Peru from
March 12 through 26, 1975. The Lima Declaration and Plan
of Action had been adopted as a whole by the Conference with
82 votes in favor, 7 abstentions, and the U.S. casting the
sole negative vote. Among the provisions in the Lima
Declaration was a scheme for neqotiations between develop-
ing countries and developed countries on international divi-
sion of labor. The original wording drafted by the Group of
77 called for
(d) Continuous negotiations and consultations,
based on the concept of shared development, de-
signed to ensure redeployment of industries to
175. A/Res/3362 (S-VII),at 8.
176. Press Release USUN-93(75),at 2.
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developing countries, in particular those which
process locally available raw materials or which
consume vast quantities of energy; to this end
concrete projects and development programs
should be prepared, including financial arrange-
ments on bilateral or multilateral bases. 177
Although the paragraph was substantially reworded, the sub-
stance remained the same in the final version.
(61d) Urgent consultations, taking into account
appropriate information with respect to the de-
velopment of demand and supply, availability of
production factors and their costs, the possi-
bilities and conditions of investment and the
availability of appropriate equipment and tech-
nologies, with a view to facilitating, within a
dynamic context and in accord with authorities
available to Governments, the redeployment of
certain productive capacities existing in de-
veloped countries and the creation of new in-
dustrial facilities in developing countries.
These consultations should In particular relate
to industries processing raw materials exported
by developing countries or which consume vast
quantities of energy, and should result in con-
crete proposals for inclusion in the develop-
ment programmes of participating developing
countries. 178
U.S. rejection of this scheme remained unequivocal: "(tle
believe that redeployment of industries should be a matter
of the evolution of economies rather than a question of In-
ternational policy or negotiation."'179
The Seventh Special Session also endorsed other deci-
sions taken at the UNIDO Conference,18 0 which included many
177. Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Co-
operation and Development, Second Ministerial Meeting of
the Group of 77 at Algiers, E/AC.62/4,at 17.
178. Report of the Second General Conference of UtDO
ID/CONF.3/31, at 57.
179. USUN-93(75),at 3.
180. "The General Assembly Endorses the Lima Declara-
tion and Plan of Action on Industrial Development Coopera-
tion." A/Res/3362 (S-VlI),at 9.
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of the contested issues of the NIEO.
Old wounds created by the enactment of the Charter of
Rights and Duties of States were re-opened by paragraphs 32,
33 and 76, which called for compliance with the precepts
contained in the Charter:
(32) That every State has the inalienable right
to exercise freely its sovereignty and permanent
control over its natural resources, both terres-
trial and marine, and over-all economic activity
for the exploitation of these resources in the
manner appropriate to its circumstances, Includ-
ing nationalization in accordance with Its laws
as an expression of this right, and that no
State shall be subjected to any forms of eco-
nomic, political, or other coercion which im-
pedes the full and free exercise of that In-
alienable right. 181
The U.S., in response, reiterated that sovereignty over
natural resources must be exercised in accordance with in-
ternational obligations, and stated that it would continue
to oppose the Charter as a whole so long as agreement could
not be reached on this principle. Accordingly, the U.S. ex-
tended an invitation for renegotiation of the articles in
the Charter which it had rejected.
The principle of producers associations, supported in
paragraphs 47, 48, 60(e) and (f) of the Lima Declaration,
was renounced by the U.S. as contrary to consumer interests
and stable commodity trade.
Unilateral action by producers--or unilateral
action by consumers--will not result in a stable
equilibrium in commodity trade nor promote the
expansion of markets, dependable income for pro-
ducers, adequate and dependable supplies for con-
sumers and stable prices that are both remunera-
tive to producers and fair to consumers that the
U.S. considers necessary for the international
trading system. 182
The provision in paragraph 19 calling for indexing the prices
of imports to developing countries was dismissed as infeasible
and unnecessary.
!11. ID/CONF.3/31,at 48.
182. ID/CONF.3/SR.18/Add.l/Rev. lat 32.
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In contrast to the negative comments upon the
actions of markets, the U.S. believes that
markets perform important allocation functions
more efficiently throughout an economy in most
instances than do centralized decision-making
mechanisms. 183
The Seventh Special Session also considered the recom-
mendation In paragraph 66 that UNIDO be converted Into a
specialized agency separated from the General Assembly cnd
meting In a regularly scheduled General Conference.
A draft constitution of UNIDO was circulated to member
countries, and replies were also forwarded to the General
Assembly. By that time, the U.S. position had shifted fron
being "unconvinced of the wisdom of transforming UNIDO into
a specialized agency''184 to a request that sufficient time
be extended in finding a Formulation of the final constitu-
tion for "all countries to reach consensus on a text which
reflects their interests in active participation.'1 8 5 The
U.S. suggested that a small negotiating group report back to
the 31st General Assembly.
The Seventh Special Session recommended that a confer-
ence be held In Vienna to draft a constitution for sub-
mission by the last quarter of 1976.186
5. Food and Agriculture
The area of food and agriculture was added to the agen-
da of the Seventh Special Session at the request of the
United States. The U.S. offered a well-thought-out program
which enjoyed both Congressional and Administrative backing.
During the Seventh Special Session, Congressman Donald
Fraser announced that the House of Representatives had
passe the International Development and Food Assistance
Act,lo7 which authorized a $200 million contribution by the
U.S. to the International Fund for Agricultural Development
created by the World Food Conference In Rome in November
" 13. Id., at 33.
184. TD/CONF.3/SR.l8/Add.l/Rev.l, May 9, 1975, at 34.
185. Development and International Economic Coopera-
tion, Draft Constitution of a Specialized Agency for Indus-
trial Development, A/10202/Add.l, at 19.
186. A/Res/3362 (S-VII),at 11.187. Press Release USUM-9l(75),September 11, 1975,t I.
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1974.188 The U.S. was willing to provide food aid amounting
to 6 million tons of grain 60% of the world target set by
the World Food Conference. 189 The U.S. further offered to
provide technical assistance in agriculture by introducing
a bill which would facilitate technical assistance by Amer-
ican universities. 19 0
The Seventh Special Session supported the provisions
adopted by the World Food Conference and reiterated the
targets of assistance and stockpiling food reserves set by
the Conference.191 One provision inserted at the last min-
ute by tbe Group of 77 emphasized the desire of many de-
veloping countries to increase their exports of agricultural
goods to markets in developed countries. 1 92 Tariff protec-
tion on agricultural products is generally high in developed
countries, and protection of temperate zone agricultural
products grown domestically often varies with seasons. The
U.S. had reservations on this provision:
With regard to the statement in the second para-
graph about market access and adjustment measures,
we understand developing countries' interests,
188. E/CONF.65/20, "Report of the World Food Confer-
ence'' at 12-13.
189. Speech of the Secretary of State, Bureau of Pub-
lic Affairs, September 1, 1975, at 13.
190. Id., at 7.
191. T-n order to make additional resources available
on concessional terms for agricultural development in de-
veloping countries, developed countries and developing coun-
tries in a position to do so should pledge, on a voluntary
basis, substantial contributions to the proposed Interna-
tional Fund for Agricultural Development so as to enable it
to come into being by the end of 1975, with initial re-
sources of SDR' 1,O00 million. . . . In view of the impor-
tance of food aid as a transitional measure, all countries
should accept both the principle of a minimum food aid tar-
get and the concept of forward planning of food aid. The
target for the 1975-76 season should be 10 million tons of
food grains."
A/Res/3362 (S-VIl), at 12.
192. "[Dleveloped countries should effectively facili-
tate access to their markets for food and agricultural
products of export interest to developing countries, both
in raw and processed form, and adopt adjustment measures,
where necessary." A/Res/3362/(S-VII), at 11.
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but we cannot concur in the sentence as
formulated since it is inconsistent with
United States policy. 193
6. Re-Structuring of the U.N. System
Throughout the dialogue between North and South on the
NIEO, an underlying concern of both developing countries and
developed countries was the need for improvement in the way
the U.N. handles economic problems. Although there was agree-
ment that change was needed, there was no consensus on which
aspects of organization were most in need of restructuring.
The U.S. complained of increasing difficulty neqotiating eco-
nomic matters in the General Assembly. The budget system
was complained of as being unwieldy, with overlapping funds
and programs. Developing countries demanded a forum where
interrelated issues could be negotiated, and urged an Inter-
national Trade Organization which would be in a position to
take binding decisions on interconnected economic matters.94
The General Assembly, in response to these expressed
concerns, requested a study on structural chanqes within the
U.N. system.19 5 An expert Group of 25 was appointed by the
Secretary-General, and on May 20th, 1975, they issued a
unanimous report. The report was greeted with great fanfare
in the U.S. press; a front page article in the N.Y. Times on
May 21st hailed it as "the first such major attempt at funda-
mental chan e since the world organization was formed 30
years ago." 196
The report represented a compromise package, with com-
ponent parts not to be implemented separately. 197 Broad
structural changes were proposed, including the abolition
of 164 existing suborgans of the Economic and Social Council.
193. Press Release USUN-93(75), at 3.
194. For the underlying rationale behind the need for
an ITO, see Lai Jayawardena, Annex Il,"Background Material
in the Fields of Trade, International Monetary Reform, and
Development Financing," E/AC.62/9,at 67.
195. A/Res /3343 (XXIX), December 17, 1974.
196. "Sweeping Change in U.N. is Urged by World Panel'
N.Y. Times, May 21, 1975.
197. Richard Gardner, "The U.N. and the International
Economic Order," Meeting at the Overseas Development Coun-
cil of May 22, 1975, Washington, D.C.
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The proposals included a new consultative procedure,
which would provide for negotiating groups of concerned
countries mandated to find consensus. One proposal which
the U.S. warmly supported was the consolidation of existing
development-related funds into a U.N. Development Author-
ity.19 B Budgets in the U.N. system would be rationalized
and coordinated by a central priority-making group.199 While
this would promote efficiency, it was viewed with some mis-
givings by developing countries as a means to control or
eliminate more controversial activities. Another recom-
mendation was for the creation of a new position of Director
General for Development and International Economic Coopera-
tion, second in rank only to the Secretary-General.
The Expert Group, in negotiating a package compromise
position, alienated many countries that would have sup-
ported a more modest scheme dealing purely with functional
problems in the U.N. system. The Expert Group served only
as an advisory body, and governments, who had not dele-
gated authority to the experts themselves did not feel
committed to the final outcome of negotiations. Instead of
endorsing the report of the Group of Experts, the General
Assembly recommended the creation of another committee which
would consider other proposals on restructuring of the U.N.
systems as well as the report of the Expert Group.200
Conclusion
The Seventh Special Session did not bring the U.S. or
the Group of 77 closer to agreement on any number of sub-
stantive economic problems. Although a consensus resolu-
tion did emerge at the end of the session, disagreements
were either masked by ambiguous wording or referred on to
other fora with minimal instructions on finding agreement.
To UNCTAD IV were delegated the problems of the integrated
commodity program, indexation, debt renegotiation, and a
code of conduct for the transfer of technology. A decision
on the extent to which reciprocity would be expected from
developing countries was left to the determination of the
multilateral trade negotiations in GATT. The demand for
linking of SDR's with development assistance was given un-
resolved to the IMF. The constitution of UNIDO remained to
198. "A New U.N. Structure for Global Economic Co-
Operation,' E/AC.62/9, at 41.
199. Id., at 37.
200. ATRes 3362 (S-VII) at 15.
1975]
180 TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
be drafted, and the U.S. had given no commitment to meeting
the target of 0.7% official development assistance set by
the International development strategy.
While the Group of 77 felt that it had exercised great
restraint in compromising many of its NIEO demands, the U.S.
Administration had strained its unity to the limit in pre-
paring for the Seventh Special Session. The State Depart-
ment had exercised a great deal of ingenuity in gaining the
acquiescence, if not the support, of the Treasury Department
for an international development security facility, a trust
fund supported by sale of IMF gold, willingness to enter
commodity agreements on a case by case basis, and substan-
tial food aid. Yet in bargaining with the Group of 77, the
U.S. had again presented an inconsistent position, with
promises made one day revoked the next. The Group of 77 was
also left with uncertainty whether all of Kissinger's pro-
posals would be enacted by a recalcitrant Congress or sup-
ported by a split Administration.
Agreement had been obtained largely on the premise that
discussion of the issues would be continued on a ministerial
level in a new forum specially created to link energy talks
with overall development problems. The Paris Conference on
International Cooperation, beginning on December 16, 1975,
could be seen by developing countries as a germ for the cre-
ation of an International Trade Organization that would be
able to connect negotiations on interrelated trade problems.
However, the U.S. had convened the conference for the sole
reason that energy talks could only proceed in tandem with
talks in other commissions on issues of special concern to
the Group of 77. The Administration approved the convening
of these talks with the expectation that all but the energy
commission would become empty discussions. Thus, while ex-
pectations of the Group of 77 were with great difficulty
held in abeyance by the promise of substantive talks in
Paris, the U.S. was barely able to consent to participate
in such a forum. The U.S. has not been able to modify its
position sufficiently to accede to the demands that the
Group of 77 Is likely to reiterate in Paris.
In creating a new forum for negotiations on the NIEO
outside of the General Assembly, the U.S. has succeeded in
removing the dialogue between North and South to a venue
which, while limiting the number of participants, possesses
the capacity to pursue binding negotiations. It is not
clear, however, that the U.S. is any more capable of enter-
ing into substantive talks in this new form. Unless the
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U.S. is prepared to do so, the talks on the NIEO will be-
come a kind of pea-game, with the Group of 77 chasing
around different negotiating fora in the attempt to find
the U.S. present in one of the empty shells. This game is
not likely to proceed for very long without a resumption
of conflict and polarization between North and South. If
this occurs, the South will undoubtedly resort unilaterally
to a NIEO of producer associations, trade restrictions, and
expropriations.
At this point, it is imperative for the U.S. to enter
into substantive negotiations with the Group of 77 on a
NIEO. Only thus can the possibility of mutual accommoda-
tion to an order which benefits North and South alike be
explored. A worsening economic crisis in developing coun-
tries, along with a shift in collective bargaining strength
among the Group of 77, means that the U.S. cannot indefi-
nitely postpone a decision to participate in NIEO negotia-
tions. Unless the U.S. is able to reorient Its approach to
development issues and enter into substantive talks with the
Group of 77 soon, the opportunity for dialogue may be lost
in escalating confrontation and economic warfare between
North and South.
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